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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
A. Purpose 
William James never wrote an extended or defini-
tive work on his O\m ethical theory. James did, how-
ever, write occasional essays dealing with ethical 
problems.l His letters also make abundant reference 
to ethical problems, both individual and communal.2 
In a brilliant essay on James, Josiah Royce says: 
While he really made little of the formal 
office of an ethical teacher and seldom wrote 
upon ethical controversies, he was, as a fact, 
profoundly ethical in his whole influence.3 
The primary purpose of this thesis, then, is 
to construct James's ethical theory and to determine 
1cr. especially: 11 The Moral Philosopher and 
the Moral Life" in: William James, The Will to Believe 
(New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1956). 
2cr. Henry James (ed.), The Letters of Hilliam 
James (2 vols.; Boston: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 
1920) and Ralph Barton Perry, The Thought and Character 
of William James (2 vols.; Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1935) • 
3Josiah Royce, 
the Philosolhf of Life 
Company, 19 1 1 P• 31. 
William James and Other Essays on 
(New York: The MacMillan 
1 
how it is related to the rest of his philosophy. 
B. Sources 
The most important primary sources used in the 
research for this thesis have been The Will to Believe 
(1897), Some Problems of Philosophy (1911), Memories 
and Studies (1911), and Essays in Radical Empiricism 
(1912). The first of these books contains both the 
essays "The Will to Believe" and "The Moral Philosopher 
and the Moral Life" which are essential to an under-
standing of his ethical theory. The last three books, 
all published posthumously, contain largely unconnected 
statements relating to his ethical theory. 
The most important secondary sources include 
the following works: The Letters of William James 
(1920), The Thought and Character of \"lilliam James 
(1935), and In the Spirit of William James (1938). 
The first book was odited by his oldest son, Henry 
James; it gives a wonderful insight into James's per-
sonality and contains valuable information about some 
of the "causes" which he championed. The last two books 
were both written by Ralph Barton Perry; they are almost 
indispensable to gaining an understanding of James's 
philosophy, especially his ethical theory. Victor Lloyd 
Butterfield's doctoral dissertation on "The Ethics of 
2 
William James" submitted to Harvard University in 
1935 has been of some help; it was written, however, 
before Perry's Thought and Character of William James 
was published. 
Since this thesis concentrates on James's 
ethical theory, other works of James, such as ~ 
Principles of Psychology (1891), Pragmatism (1907), 
The Meaning of Truth (1909), and A Pluralistic Universe 
(1909), have been used only to the extent that they have 
reference to his ethical theory. Other secondary 
sources which I have used less extensively are: Emile 
Boutroux•s William James (1912), Horace M. Kallen's 
The Philosophy of William James (1925), Lloyd Morris's 
William James (1950), and the papers presented in In 
Commemoration of William James and published by Columbia 
University Press in 1942. 
c. Method 
The overall method of the thesis will be to try 
to relate questions both of metaphysical and ethical 
significance in an attempt to construct James's ethical 
theory. 
In terms of procedure, in Chapter II I shall con-
sider the place of reason in James's ethical theory. 
It is very important to understand the place of reason 
3 
in an ethical theory because it is around the resolu-
tion of that problem that the whole modus of the support 
for the basic principles will be hinged. If reason is 
to be the final judge of proper and improper ethical 
principles, those principles will be supported by an 
entirely different manner than if reason is considered 
to be limited. I shall analyze James's treatment of 
this problem by first looking at the arguments advanced 
by those who feel reason should be the final judge and 
James's criticism of those arguments. Secondly, I shall 
consider James's rejection of scepticism as an adequate 
reply to the recognition that reason is limited and 
finally, I shall present James's definition of that 
which goes beyond reason -- the volitional nature. 
In Chapter III, I shall examine the place of 
the volitional nature in James's ethical theory by 
presenting smne of the limitations which James imposes 
upon the exercise of the volitional nature. Also in 
this chapter, I shall attempt to clarify further James's 
position by considering some of the criticisms which 
have been offered against it. 
Chapter IV will deal with the basic principles 
of James's ethical theory. It will begin vii th a con-
sideration of the metaphysical problem of determinism 
versus indeterminism. In the second section the casuis-
4 
tic problem of seeking a principle for determining 
right or wrong in conduct will be considered. In the 
last t1r10 sections of this chapter, the place of the 
individual and of evil will be presented. 
James's application of his ethical theory to 
social criticism will be the subject of the fifth 
chapter. In considering this topic, I will concen-
trate, not only on the extent of James's involvement 
in social criticism, but also the application of his 
ethical theory to the areas he chose to criticize. 
The sixth and final chapter will contain a 
summary and the conclusions of my thesis. 
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CHAPTE.."'l II 
THE PLACE OF REASON IN THE ETHICAL 
THRORY OF WILLIAM JTAMES 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine James's 
view of the use of reason in making ethical decisions. 
An examination of this nature is necessary to a discussion 
of value theory because the solution of tho problem as 
to whether reason alone is sufficient for an ethical 
theory will set the whole temper of the argument to 
follow. James thinks that reason is severely limited 
and that ethical decisions may and must be properly made 
outside the bounds of reason alone. He refers to that 
which is operative outside the bounds of reason as 
1faith 1 or •volitional nature• or •willing nature•. 
He made little or no real distinction between religion 
and ethics and used these words alrr~st interchangeably. 
However, I think that the phrase •volitional nature• 
is the most descriptive phrase for our purposes, and 
I shall therefore attempt to use it whenever its use 
does not seriously alter James's own statements. 
In order to proceed with the examination, I 
shall first discuss the epistemological base of the 
position which Ja~es declares is contrary to his own. 
6 
That position is referred to by him as 'intellectualism•. 
Secondly, I shall present a brief explanation of James's 
own epistemology which he labels •radical empiricism•. 
James 1 s criticism of intellectualism takes a tvJO-fold 
course. In the initial attempt to criticize intellec-
tualism, I shall present his arguments for the limita-
tion of reason. In a separate section, and before pro-
ceeding to the final criticism of intellectualism, I 
shall define and give the arguments for the necessity 
of using our volitional nature. The final criticism of 
intellectualism will be based upon the impossibility of 
being maintained on its own grounds. The next section 
will deal with James's criticism of scepticism and the 
last section will explain James's view of the use of 
volitional nature. 
A. Intellectualism 
James contrasts his view that volitional nature 
is properly operative beyond the bounds of reason to the 
position he calls 'intellectualism•. Intellectualism 
bases its claims upon two postulates: 
1. It uostulate~ that to escape error is 
our paramount duty. ~aith may grasp truth; but 
also it may not. By resisting it always, we are 
sure of escaping error; and if by the same act 
we renounce our chance at truth, that loss is 
the lesser evil, and should be incurred. 
2. It postulates that in every respect the 
7 
universe is finished in advance of our dealings 
with it.l 
Within the general position of intellectualism1 
James distinguishes two sub-positions.2 First, there 
are the rationalistic intellectualists who rely on the 
use of deductive and dialectic arguments as the sole 
ultimate source of evidence for reason. James's examples 
of this view are: Hegel, Bradley, A. E. Taylor and Royce. 
Second, there are the empirical intellectualists who, in 
attempting to be scientific, think that we must give 
assent only to those propositions which can be supported 
by evidence found in our sensible experiences. James's 
examples of this view are: w. K. Clifford and Karl 
Pearson. Both positions are united in distrusting any 
proposition which is not inferred from sufficient evi-
dence. They are divided as to what constitutes suffic-
ient evidence. 
B. Radical Empiricism 
While it is possible to argue that James's 
position1 which he called •radical empiricism•, can be 
seen as the result of accepting the reliance upon sense-
(New 
1William James, Some Problems of Philoso~hy 
York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1924), P• 2 2. 
2rbid., P• 221. 
8 
n 
" , ' 
"' r ' 
experience of the intellectualistic empiricists along 
with the attempt to 'get beyond' sense-experience of 
the rationalistic intellectualists, I think that such 
an analysis would be both confusing and misleading; 
confusing, because James's position can be more clearly 
viewed as a third alternative rather than a synthesis 
of the other two; and misleading, because in naming 
his position radical empiricism, James wanted to call 
attention to the radical break which he was attempting 
to make with intellectualism. 
In the preface to The Will to Believe, which is 
James's major work dealing with the limitations of 
reason, he says that the book is intended to be an 
exam~le of the temper of his doctrine called 'radical 
empiricism'.! It is beyond the scope of our interests 
now to go into James's brand of empiricism for two 
reasons. First, he had not formally established his 
empiricism at the time he wrote about the limitations 
of reason and second, it is not necessary to argue the 
establishment of his empiricism to understand his asser-
tion of the limitations of reason. It will be helpful, 
however, to understand what he means by 'radical 
empiricism' in order to contrast it with the conflicting 
1James, The Will to Believe, p. vii. 
9 
views of intellectualistic empiricism and rationalism, 
and also in order to lay the foundation upon which the 
limitations of reason may be established: 
Radical empiricism consists first of a 
postulate, next of a statement of fact, and 
finally of a generalized conclusion. 
The postulate is that the only things that 
shall be debatable among philosophers shall be 
things definable in terms drawn from experience. 
The statement of fact is that the relations 
between things, conjunctive as well as disjunctive, 
are just as much matters of direct particular 
experience, neither more nor less so, than the 
things themselves. 
The generalized conclusion is that therefore 
the parts of experience hold together from next 
to next by relations that are themselves parts 
of experience. The directly apprehended universe 
needs, in short, no extraneous trans-empirical 
connective support, but possesses in its own right 
a concatenated or continuous structure.l 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
I say •empiricism' because it is contented 
to regard its most assured conclusions concerning 
matters of fact as hypotheses liable to modifi-
cation in the course of future experience; and 
I say 'radical' because it treats the doctrine 
of monism itself as an hypothesis, and, unlike 
so much of half-way empiricism (this is the 
empiricism he labels 'intellectualistic 
empiricism •) that is current under the name of 
positivism or agnosticism or scientific 
naturalism, it does not dogmatically affirm 
lwilliam James, The Meani~ of Truth (New York: 
Longmans, Green and Company, 1969~ pp. x11 - xiii. 
A re-statement of this position is found in: William 
James, Essays in Radical Empiricism, ed. Ralph Barton 
Perry (New York: LOngmans, Green and Company, 1912), 
pp. ix - xii. 
10 
monism as something with which all experiAnce 
has got to square,I 
Ir, then, experience is to play the major role 
in critical philosophical discourse, there is one of 
two alternatives lert open, Either it must be assumed 
that reasoning on the basis of experience is the sufric-
ient and sole source of truth, or it may be assumed 
that there is more truth than can be known by reasoning 
rrom experience, If the latter position is the correct 
one, there should be some account given ror a method 
to attain critically truth which is beyond experience, 
It is the latter position which James wants to defend 
and the next section will be devoted to his defense of 
that position, 
\ C, Initial Criticism or Intellectualism 
"' ... ,_ 
- •-"'..{_,_. 
~'James makes a distinction between two different 
kinds of epistemological maxims: 
viii. 
There are two ways of looking at our duty 
in the matter of opinion, -- ways entirely 
dirferent, and yet ways about 1~hose dirference 
the theory of knowledge seems hitherto to have 
shown very little concern, We must know the 
truth; and we must avoid error, -- these are our 
first and great commandments as would-be knowers; 
but they are not two ways of stating an identical 
commandment, they are two separable laws.2 
lwilliam James, The Will to Believe, pp. vii -
2 Ibid,, P• 17. 
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The di~~erence between these laws lies in the 
increased restrictiveness o~ the second one. James 
goes on to say: 
Although it may indeed happen that when we 
believe the truth A, we escape as an incidental 
consequence ~rom believing the ~alsehood B, it 
hardly ever happens that by merely disbelieving 
B we necessarily believe A. We may in escaping 
B ~all into other ~alsehoods, C or D, just as 
bad as B; or we may escape B by not believing 
anything at all, not even A.l 
It is o~ten necessary to choose between the 
commandments to know truth or to avoid error. The 
choice one makes will i~luence his whole intellectual 
life. For some philosophers, the thought o~ being mis-
taken is a dread~ul one and they are, thus, guided by 
a principle to avoid, at all costs, being mistaken. 
James does not ~ear the possibility o~ being mistaken 
as much as he ~ears the possibility of having truth 
within his grasp and losing i!•J James sees this 
epistemological conservatism (~ear o~ being mistaken) 
as rampant in the sciences, and with some justi~ication, 
but because o~ a di~~erence in duration between science 
and an individual's li~e, such conservatism ~or an 
individual is unwarranted: 
At most, the command laid upon us by science 
to believe nothing not yet veri~ied by the senses 
1 Ibid., p. 18. 
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is a prudential rule intended to maximize our 
right thinking and minimize our errors in the 
1£BB run.J In the particular instance we-must 
?requentiy lose truth by obeying it; but on the 
whole we are safer if we follow it consistently, 
for we are sure to cover our losses with our 
gains. It is like those gambling and insurance 
rules based on probability, in which we secure 
ourselves against losses in detail by hedging 
on the total run.l 
Let us carry James's insurance analogy further. 
If one could be guaranteed a certain life span, there 
is a point (about two-thirds the life ef.the policy) at 
which it would be more profitable for him or for his 
family if he did not purchase life insurance; or if 
one could be guaranteed of no fires (or even his nor-
mal proportion of fires), it would obviously be to his 
financial benefit to forego the purchase of fire insur-
ance. Indeed, it is the difference between the normal 
life or fire-expectancy and the amount the policy-holders 
pay that allows the insurance companies to make a profit. 
Thus, if we could all be assured of 'normal' hazards and 
no more, we would need no insurance. The problem is 
that we can be assured of no such treatment. As a 
group and over a sufficient amount of time, we all get 
'normal' treatment (by the definition of 'normal') our 
losses £!£ be offset against our gains, but as individ-
1 ~., P• 94. 
13 
uals we may get completely •abnormal' treatment.l This, 
the~is comparable to the drive or science. Over a long 
enough time and with a surricient number of people work-
ing in science, by adhering to that which is demonstrable 
to us by our senses, it may be possible to absorb temp-
orary losses or truth with other gains. 
There are some problems, however, ror which an 
insurance company approach is not reasible. Suppose, 
ror example, that I reel there is a 50-50 chance that a 
person with whom I have an appointment in Boston will 
actually be there. Should I go 50 per cent or the way 
to Boston? In some cases, we must be ready to accept 
an all or nothing attitude. As James says about such 
cases, "To calculate the probabilities and act rrac-
tionally, and treat lire one day as a farce, and another 
day as a very serious business, would be to make the 
worst possible mess or it11 .2 The most rundamental 
ethical questions rall into this category. We have 
available to us one or rour attitudes which we must 
choose between: 
lJames gives a 
insurance analogy in: 
p. 226. 
2ng., P• 288. 
rurther elucidation or this 
James, Some Problems of Philosophy, 
, 
1. Follow intellectualist advice: wait 
for evidence; and while waiting, do nothing; or 
2. Mistrust the other powers and, sure that 
the universe will fail, ~ lt fail; or 
3. Trust them; and at any rate do our best, 
in spite of the if; or, finally, 
4• Flounder, spending one day in one attitude, 
another day in another. 
This 4th way is no systematic solution. The 
2nd way spells faith in failure. The 1st way may 
in practice be indistinguishable from the 2nd way. 
The 3rd way seems the only wise way.l 
When James advises to •trust the other powers' 
he means that one should act as if the judgment of the 
volitional nature is true in spite of the fact that the 
judgment has not been derived from a strict process of 
reasoning. As individuals, it would be foolish to wait 
for a process of error-avoidance to recoup losses of 
truth. The individual must have truth in the very 
limited time-span of his life or go without; he cannot 
say contentedly that maybe in another century truth will 
come ; he must 
'~!. t-
never. James 
have a sufficient amount of truth now or 
" .; feels that it is an excess of naivete for 
philosophers to insist that information which is given 
by science and the senses is the only believable area 
of concern. As long as the individual is confined to 
this time and as long as he wants to have more truth 
1~ •• pp. 229-230. 
15 
than is given him by his senses and his reason, he must 
be willing to give intellectual assent to other areas 
~---,f' 7 
of cognition such as his volitional nature:) In the 
following quotation James first describes the argument 
of those who will accept only the judgments of reason 
and second, shows the foolishness of such a position. 
The intellectualists to whom he is referring are 
actually the associationalist and epiphenominalist 
psychologists who degrade so completely the volitional 
nature. The point to be retained for our purposes, 
however, is that James wants to allow room for depart-
ment Number Three (volitional nature) to be properly 
operative, and he thinks that the contrary claim is 
not only foolishly restrictive but also based on a 
misconception as to the method and function of science: 
It is base, it is vile, it is the lowest 
depth of immorality [Bay the intellectualistfi] , 
to allow department Number Three (volitional 
natur~ to interpose its demands, and have any 
vote fn the question of what is true and what is 
false; the mind must be a passive, reactionless 
sheet of white paper, on which reality will simply 
come and register its own philosophic definition, 
as the pen registers the curve on a sheet of 
chronograph. "Of all the cants that are canted in 
this canting age" this has always seemed to me the 
most wretched, especially when it comes from 
professed psychologists. As if' the mind could, 
consistently with its definition, be a reactionless 
sheet at all! As if conception could possibly occur 
except for a teleological purpose, except to show 
us the way from a state of things the senses 
cognize to another state of things our will desires! 
As if 'science' itself were anything else than 
such an end of desire, and a most peculiar one at 
that! And as if the 1 truths' of bare physics in 
16 
particular, which these sticklers ror intellectual 
purity contend to be the only uncontaminated rorm, 
were not as great an alteration and ralsification 
or the simply 'given' order or the world, into an 
order conceived solely ror the mind's convenience 
and del!ght, as any theistic doctrine possible 
can be~ 
Reason is, arter all, limited, It is limited 
because it can only prevent one rrom accepting an error, 
while it alone cannot help to gain the truth which is 
beyond it. James is not as interested in strictly 
avoiding error as he is in attaining truth, or course, 
James is not willing to give bis assent to all proposi-
tions no matter what conclusions reason develops. \ihere 
there iS a preponderance or evidence to RUppert the 
truth or an inrerence he is ready to give his assent, 
but where the evidence is at best non-conclusive, he 
reels that the volitional nature should not be counted 
I 
out._; 
D. That Which Lies Beyond Reason 
Berore proceeding rurther, it is imperative 
that an initial derinition or the volitional nature 
be given. The point to be retained from the preceding 
section is that there is 'something more' than reason 
I 
which is and should be operativet Whether this 1 some-
, 
1James, The \'iill to Believe, p. 129. 
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thing more' is called •faith•, which is the label James 
uses in his writings concerned with religion; or 
•volitional nature•k the label he uses in his writings 
concerned with ethical theory, makes little difference 
to him: 
As for faith, don't treat it as a technical 
word. It simply means the kind of belief a person 
may have in a doubtful case -- and may carry a 
sense of 'heat in your throat•, readytobackoutness, 
or a sort of passionate refusal to give up, or any-
thing between; and is the same state when applied 
to some practical affair of your own, or to a 
theological creed.l 
And further in replying to J. M. Baldwin who had requested 
a definition of the 'Will to Believe•, James says: 
It seems to me absurd to make a technical 
term of the "Will to Believe" ••• • What I meant 
by that title was the state of mind of the man 
who finds an impulse in him toward a believing 
attitude, and who resolves not to quench it 
simply because doubts of its truth are possible. 
Its opposite would be the maxim: Believe in 
nothing which you can possibly doubt. Pray 
leave it out of your dictionary.2 
Perry points out in this context in In the 
Spirit of William James, that it is the rationalists, 
not the empiricists who are reluctant to go beyond 
reason: 
It is sometimes supposed that the recognition 
of a domain of faith, where belief exceeds evidence, 
1Perry, 
2 Ibid., 
is to Baldw'iri • s 
{New York: The 
The Thought and Character ••• , II, 211. 
p. 244• The reference to a dictionary 
Dictionary of PhilosophT and Psychology 
Macmillan Company, 1902 • 
18 
is characteristic of rationalistic rather than of 
empiricist philosophers. The reverse of this is 
in fact the case. • • • It was Kant, as opposed 
to his rationalistic predecessors, who introduced 
faith on purely philosophical grounds. • • • Hume 
affords an equally notable example of a philoso-
pher who, having limited theoretical knowledge 
to the verification of actual experience, finds 
that practical belief must exceed these bounds. 
He acknowledged, in short, a "must believe" which 
is non-theoretical •• • • There is, indeed, a 
curious paradox by which those philosophers who 
are most strict and narrow in their conception 
of knowledge are compelled to make the largest 
provision for faith.1 
When theoretical knowledge is limited to the 
verification of actual experience, it is necessary to 
make room for practical belief. The volitional nature 
is the practical belief which has had room made for it. 
It springs from the limitations of reason as the only 
practical alternative, and its position is that of 
being better than nothing. No claim should be made that 
the volitional nature will in every instance be the 
source of the final truth on all problems; its use is 
based upon the hypothetical hope that by exercising it, 
one may avoid needlessly losing truth. As James says 
in another context: 
Empiricism, believing in possibilities, is 
willing to formulate its universe in hypothetical 
lRalph Barton Perry, In The Stirit of William 
James (Bloomington: Indiana Universi y Press, 1958), 
pp. 171-172. 
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propositions. Rationalism, believing only in 
impossibilities and necessities, insists on the 
contrary on their being categorical.l 
James is following in this tradition after hav-
ing established his primary interest in an empirical 
approach to knowledge. 
In resuming the discussion of the attempt to 
demonstrate the limitations of reason, it will be 
helpful to turn to James once again. "After all that 
reason can do has been done, there still remains the 
opacity of finite facts as merely given, with most of 
their peculiarities mutually unmediated and unex-
plained", and "'Reason', as a gifted writer says, 
'is but one item in the mystery•".2 
In sum, James's essential argument for the 
limitation of reason is that there is something more, 
and we must give a philosophical account for that 
•something more•. The volitional nature, which James 
identifies as that •something more' is essential to 
the intellectual process and it is, according to him, 
only by a most unjustified blindness that some choose 
to ignore it or treat it as non-essential: 
lJames, Some Problems of Philosophy, p. 229. 
2James, The Will to Believe, pp. viii - ix. 
20 
I cannot willfully agree to keep my willing 
nature out of the game because a rule of thinking 
which would absolutely prevent me from acknow-
ledging certain kinds of truth if those kinds of 
truth were really there, would be an irrational 
rule.l 
It is an act of wanton foolishness to obey 
a rule of thinking which prevents one from acknowled-
ging certain kinds of truth if those kinds were really 
available. Furthermore, not only does James feel that 
one can properly give assent to non-reasoned conclusions, 
but also he feels that failure to give such assent reduces 
the richness and value of one's life. "•Don't guess• 
would abolish three-quarters of life at a stroke; and 
probably condemn us in advance to lose the truth in most 
cases".2 There is, then, a distinction between rational 
and non-rational assent. In some instances, the latter 
is proper and pragmatically supportable because it adds 
richness and value to one's life. A closer examination 
of the intellectualist position will show it to be 
impossible to maintain on its own grounds. 
E. Final Criticism of Intellectualism 
In the initial criticism of intellectualism, 
libid., p. 28. 
2Perry, The Thought and Character •• • , II, 
p. 244. 
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James merely asserted that reason is limited and that 
it is proper for him to exercise his volitional nature 
within limits. In this section, I shall present his 
final and most critical blow against those who would 
still cling to reason as the sole source of truth. He \; 
says, "One•s conviction that the evidence one goes by 
is of the objective brand is only one more subjective 
opinion added to the lot",l The charge to be pressed, 
then, against the intellectualists is that their own 
insistence upon the exclusive domain of reason is 
itself not the product of a process of reasoning, but 
of an exercise of their own volitional nature~ This 
~ 
contention is initially more graphic in the charge 
James makes against scientists: 
The necessity of faith as an ingredient in 
our mental attitude is strongly insisted on by 
the scientific philosophers of the present day; 
but by a singularly arbitrary caprice they say that 
it is only legitimate when used in the interests 
of one particular proposition, -- the proposition, 
namely, that the course of nature is uniform. 
That nature will follow to-morrow (sic.) the same 
laws that she follows to-day (sic,) is, they all 
admit, a truth which no man can~; but in the 
interests of cognition as well as of action we 
must postulate or assume it. • • • With regard 
to all other possible truths, however, a number 
of our most influential contemporaries think that 
an attitude of fai~~ is not only illogical but 
shameful. Faith in a religious dogma for which 
there is no outward proof, but which we are 
lJames, The Will to Believe, p. 16, 
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tempted to postulate ror our emotional interests, 
just as we postulate the unirormity of nature for 
our intellectual interests, is brandea by 
Professor Huxley as "the lowest depth of immoral-
ity."l 
If the scientist must exercise his volitional 
nature in assuming that nature is uniform, James feels 
that the intellectualist must exercise his volitional 
nature in assuming that nothing should be believed 
unless verified by reason. "The question whether we 
have a right to believe anything before verification 
concerns not the constitution of truth, but the policy 
of belief. tt2 
Thus, those who insist upon the exclusive 
primacy of reason (the intellectualists) cannot justify 
such an insiste.nce by an appeal to reason. While they 
value the avoidance of error, that value is only one 
among many others. It was no mistaken choice of words 
when James defined 'intellectualism• as: 
the belief that our mind comes upon a 
world complete in itself, and has the duty 
of ascertaining its contents; but has no power 
of re-determining its character for that is 
already given. 3 
libid., PP· 91-92. 
2Perry, The Thought and Character ••• , II, 
p. 249. 
3James, Some Problems of Philosophy, p. 221. 
(italics mine). 
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" 
Intellectualism is finally a belief, it relies essen-
tially on the same kind of volitional assumption that 
science relies on, and it cannot be justified by reason 
alone. 
Some philosophers have insisted upon consistency 
as being a prime criterion of philosophical criticism. 
Yet, the desire for consistency may be another act of 
the volitional nature which these philosophers are 
willing to take unaware of the implications: 
Our knowledge being so fragmentary, "inconsis-
tent thought is no doubt truer" (in the sense of 
agreement with fact) than consistent thought; and 
we must attribute the demand for consistency, 
therefore, to an independent subjective passion.l 
Thus, it would seem that even those who most 
characteristically suspect the use of the volitional 
nature and non-reasoned cognition must rely themselves 
in their own systematic endeavors upon the kind of a 
use of volitional nature which they suspect. 
F. Criticism of Scepticism 
Since James does, in developing his ethical 
principles, come to the position that moral scepticism \J 
is no different essentially than immorality, it is 
1Perry, The Thought and Character ••• , II, 
p. 254. 
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important at this point to turn to his attack upon the 
sceptic who, like him, understands the limits or rea-
son, but who, unlike him, makes such limitations system-
atically restrictive: 
Scepticism, then, is not avoidance of option; 
it is option of a certain particular kind of 
risk. Better risk loss of truth than chance of 
error, -- that is your faith-vetoers exact posi-
tion. It is not intellect against all passions, 
then, it is only intellect with one passion lay-
ing down its law.l 
It would seem, then, with the final loss of 
even scepticism as an adequate reply to James, we must 
conclude that reason is limited, that there is •some-
thing more' and with Pascal, "'Le coeur a ses raisons 
que la raison ne conn~1t pas•".2 Reason is not alone, 
there must be something more operative. Science is 
not the only proper area of intellectual discourse, 
there is something which is justified and beyond 
science. The following quotations should demonstrate 
the place for science and reason: 
In this very University, accordingly, I have 
heard more than one teacher say that all the 
fundamental conceptions of truth have already 
been found by science, and that the future has 
only the details of the picture to fill in. 
1James, The Will to Believe, pp. 26-27. 
2 Ibid., P• 21. 
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But the slightest reflection on the real condi-
tions will suffice to show how barbaric such 
notions are. They show such a lack of scienti-
fic imagination, that it is hard to see how one 
who is actively advancing any part of science can 
make a mistake so crude. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
No! our science is a drop, our ignorance a sea. 
Whatever else be certain, this at least is cer-
tain, that the world of our present natural 
knowledge is enveloped in a larger world of some 
sort of whose residual properties we at present 
can frame no positive idea.l 
And further: 
Pretend what we may, the whole man within 
us is at work when we form our philosophical 
opinions. Intellect, will, taste and passion 
co-operate just as they do in practical affairs; 
and lucky it is if the passion be not something 
as petty as a love of personal conquest over the 
philosopher across the way.2 __t, c ;, :~. / 
G. James's Attempt to ~o Beyond Reason 
If the attachment which the intellectualists 
hold for the complete sufficiency of reason is ultimately 
based upon their volitional nature, it must be no less 
true that James's insistence upon the limitations of 
reason is based upon his volitional nature. There is 
no process of reasoning which ca~ aid in an understanding 
that reason is limited. Induction and deduction are 
useless; seduction is the only real alternative. Agree-
1Ibid., PP• 53-54. 
2Ibid., P• 92. 
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ment must come by persuasion. As Perry says: 
The style of the essays in The Will to 
Believe is governed not so much by literary 
taste as by a desire both to express and to in-
duce conviction.l 
James himself says that he deliberately attempted to 
attain 11 effe.ctiveness in composition" in one of the 
essays in The Will to Believe.2 One cannot come to 
this conclusion as the result of reasoning from 
evidence. Either we understand and give our assent 
to the limitations of reason and the legitimacy of 
going beyond, or we don•t; there is no coercive evidence 
yea or nay except the foolishness and the arbitrariness 
of the contrary opinion. 
Before continuing with this discussion of a 
justification of volitional nature, it may be well to 
point out, that James was not at all saying that all 
people had to engage in the use of volitional nature 
in his manner. He was willing to take the risk as 
worth the reward. A person might find that for him 
the risk of being wrong is too great and still be 
consistent with James's view of reason. James was 
only trying to pave the way for people who wanted 
lPerry, The Thought and Character ••• , II, 208. 
2Ibid. I I, 620. 
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to use their faith at their own risk and he wanted 
to say that sometimes the investment was very sound. 
Indeed, there are times when one's use of his 
volitional nature can bias a result completely. For 
example, suppose that I am in a sailboat which has 
sprung a leak. I can, as a rationalist would do, sit 
and calculate the rate of speed at which the water is 
entering and the probable rate of speed that I can 
bail the boat and make a determination as to whether 
I can keep the boat afloat. However, by the time I 
have concluded my calculations, I may find the boat 
so full that I will not be able to save it, whereas if 
I had just set to when the leak originally appeared 
and started bailing, I might have saved it. Or, I could, 
as a sceptic would do, refuse to bail at all because 
I am unsure whether my efforts will keep the boat afloat, 
and by my refusal have it sink. or, finally, I could 
jump to, and bail the boat and by my action and faith, 
save the boat. There are, of course, two other alterna-
tives. One is to see that the hole is so small and 
calculate so quickly that I conclude that I should bail; 
the other is to see the hole is so big and calculate so 
quickly that I conclude that I should jump overboard. 
However, in both these last two instances reason is 
not limited; it allows us to develop a conclusion on 
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the basis of the evidence. The example, however, is 
intended for the instance when reason is insufficient 
and in that case, the other three alternatives are 
operational. In short, there are circumstances in which 
the act of faith confirms itself. The sceptic, in 
this example, is no different than the man who decides 
the boat cannot be saved, and James says that far from 
being impartial, he is casting his lot with that view. 
The intellectualist must become a sceptic when-
ever evidence is insufficient, yet James feels that 
scepticism is not avoidance of option; it is option of 
a certain particular kind of risk.l To say that I don 1 t 
know whether the stock market will rise or fall, and 
therefore I will not invest my money in it is not to 
avoid an option; it is rather to cast one 1 s lot with 
those who think it will fall -- and by such casting, 
helping to confirm that prediction. With certain options, 
decisions cannot be avoided, for the decision to suspend 
decision-making is still a decision -- and must be 
justified as such. Indeed, there are times when a 
decision may confirm the result it is intended to 
reflect. For example, James, at one point, asks the 
lsee above, P• 24 or, James, The Will to Believe, 
P• 26. 
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question, 11 Is life worth living?"l He concludes that 
if one goes beyond the bounds of reason and assumesit 
is; he may confirm his own faith; or if he still goes 
beyond the bounds of reason and assumes it is not; he 
may confirm that faith. The sceptic, of course, by 
attempting to avoid making a decision will probably 
confirm that attitude and die undecided or, even worse, 
because he has denied that life is worth living, he 
will find it not worth living. 
There are, then, instances in which a use of 
volitional nature to determine a certain outcome will 
confirm itself, but is this so in all cases? Will 
wishing always make it so? Is faith in a particular 
conclusion always justified? James says absolutely 
no on all three accounts. There are certain conditions 
under which a use of the volitional nature is justified 
and some conditions under which it is not. Wishing away 
that leak in the boat won't confirm itself any more 
than wishing that there is an oil well in my backyard 
will make it so, no matter how strong my volitional 
nature. One needs to exercise his volitional nature 
within certain limits and it is necessary to examine 
those limits. As James says, "Man needs a rule for his 
will, and will invent one if one be not given him11 .2 
l~•l Po 32ffo 
2~ •• Po 88. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE PLACE OF VOLITIONAL NATURE IN THE 
ETHICAL THEORY OF WILLIAM JAMES 
James feels that reason is limited. The con~ 
trary claim that it is not limited already proceeds 
beyond the bounds of reason in attempting to establish 
its own claim. It would seem that, given the tact 
that reason is limited, one could either decide that 
he would rely on reason wherever possible and maintain 
a sceptical attitude at the points at which reason is 
limited, or he could decide that there must be some-
thing which may be properly operative when reason is 
limited. As a result of the inability of scepticism 
to make adequate provision tor an active lite, and 
as a result of the fact that scepticism itself is 
based upon a non-reasoned conviction, James adopts the 
latter position with some reservations. The nature and 
extent of those reservations will be the subject of 
the first section of this chapter. James's recognition 
of the limitation of reason and the criteria tor the 
conditions under which one should go beyond reason 
have important implications tor the foundation of his 
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basic ethical principles. These implications will be 
examined in the second section or this chapter. The 
various theories or James in this chapter and the 
previous one have come under serious attack rrom many 
sources. It is important to examine the criticisms 
berore analyzing the basic principles or his ethical 
theory and their application by James to social 
criticism. Thererore. the third and rinal section 
will be an examination, rirst or some or the criticisms 
orrered by people other than myselr,and second or my 
own critical rerlections on James's position. 
Ao Criteria For Exercise or Volitional Nature 
In order to investigate the conditions under 
which volitional nature or raith is properly operative 
ror James, it is necessary to consider rirst James's 
purpose in trying to justiry raith. James relt that 
the excessively sceptical and scientiric attitude preva-
lent in the academic world or his day was rorcing the 
proponents or that attitude to give up needlessly an 
opportunity to attain truth and lead a richer lire, 
and rurthermore their attitude was leading them to act 
as ir they had decided against many or the positions 
on which they were claiming a suspension or judgment. 
Under certain conditions, James reels that one can and 
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should be ready to act in accordance with his volitional 
nature. He was not, however, attempting to let people 
believe whatever they wished; he realized the foolish-
ness of such a position, He felt that the audience 
whom he was addressing had become so impressed with 
the reasoning power of science that they had forgotten 
that there is more to life than science. As to the 
public in general he says clearly: 
What mankind at large most lacks is criti-
cism and caution, not faith. Its cardinal weak-
ness is to let belief follow recklessly upon 
lively conception, especially when that concep-
tion has instructive liking at its back. I ad-
mit, then, that were I addressing the Salvation 
Army or a miscellaneous popular crowd it would 
be a misuse of opportunity to preach the liberty 
of believing as I have in these pages preached 
it, What such audiences most need is that their 
faiths should be broken up and ventilated, that 
the northwest wind of science should get into 
them and blow their sickliness and barbarism 
away,l 
This quotation may give an indication of the 
first and most important condition for an exercise of 
our volitional nature. The evidence which can be 
brought to the consideration of the proposition in 
question must be either non-conclusive, or non-existent. 
In the ex~ples used in the previous chapter, it is 
1J~es, The Will to Believe, P• x. 
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not justifiable to wish away the leak in the sailboat 
because there is sufficient conclusive evidence that 
it is there, just as there is sufficient conclusive 
evidence that there is no oil in my backyard. James 
clearly says in reference to the major thesis or 
"The Will to Believe": 
The thesis I defend is, briefly stated, this: 
Our passional nature not only lawfully may, but 
must, decide an option between prbiositions, 
whenever it is a ~enuine option t t cannot by 
its nature be dec ded on intellectual grounds.l 
It will become apparent later what the conditions 
for a genuine option are; the point to be retained is 
that the option cannot by its nature be decided on in-
tellectual grounds. For James, the reason for the 
fact that the option cannot be decided on intellectual 
grounds is that the available evidence is or a non-
conclusive nature. At this point, James identifies non-
conclusiveness with non-intellectual and contrasts 
these with reason which is the intellectual process or 
developing a conclusion from a given body or evidence. 
Ralph Barton Perry gives a very helpful illustration 
in defending and explaining James's point. Perry says: 
There are two circles of truth -- an outer 
and an inner circle. The outer or more inclusive 
1 ~·• p. 11 (italics his). 
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circle embraces all justified beliefs. The 
inner circle consists of those beliefs which 
possess that restricted sort of justification 
which it will be convenient to term evidential 
or theoretical verification.l 
It is apparent that James did not make this 
insistence upon the non-conclusiveness of evidence alto-
gather clear. Dickinson s. Miller who was on other 
grounds in agreement with James attacked him in an 
article entitled, "'The Will to Believe• and the Duty 
to Doubt11 .2 L. T. Hobhouse attacked him in an article 
entitled, 11Fai th and The Will to Believe" .3 Hobhouse 
expressed the essence of both these criticisms by 
saying that James's view consists of two doctrines: 
"The first is that by believing a thing we make it true; 
the second is, that we can believe in a thing without 
asking ourselves seriously whether it is true or 
false. 114 In a letter to Henry Rutgers Marshall about 
lRalph Barton Perry, In The Stirit of William 
James (Bloomington: Indiana Universi y Press, 1958), 
pp. 173-174· 
2D. s. Miller, "'The Will to Believe• and the 
Duty to Doubt", International Journal of Ethics, IX 
(1898-1899), 171 • 
3t. T. Hobhouse, "Faith and The Will to Believe", 
Proceedings of The Aristotelian Society, IV (1904), 
87 ff. 
4rbid •• p. 91. 
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Miller's attackl and in another letter to Robhouse,2 
James complained that both men had failed to realize 
that his position "treated the faith-attitude as a 
necessity for individuals, because the total •evidence•, 
which only the race can draw, has to include their 
experiments among its data11 .3 James cannot be accused 
of complete obscurity on this point, however. At 
least H •. R. Marshall4 and F. c. s. Schiller apparently 
grasped the point. Schiller said in a letter to c. A. 
Strong about Miller's article: 
This UMiller•s article and ensuing corres-
pondence with James and Mille~ made me realize 
for the first time how James's principle was 
being misconstrued (by ignoring its demand for 
empirical verification) as an incitement to 
make-believe.S 
There is still today some confusion among 
philosophers on this point, but the confusion is by 
lHenry James (ed.), The Letters of William James 
(2 vola.; Boston: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1920), 
II, 86-87. 
2~., PP• 207-209. 
3 Ibid., P• 207. 
4H. R. Marshall, "Belief and Will", International 
Journal of Ethics, IX (1898-1899), 285 ff. 
~alph Barton Perry, The Thought and Character 
of William James (2 vols; Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1935), II, 241. 
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no means universal. Paul Henle in an introductory 
article on James says: 
It is important to notice, however, that 
James allowed this method of settling problems 
only as a last resort, only when there is no 
possibility of obtaining evidence by any 
ordinary method.l 
I have emphasized this point somewhat extensively 
because it is the subject of such a great deal of 
neglect. Philosophers have often accused James of 
making any statement available to people by way of 
faith, but they have just failed to read him carefully. 
Time and again he says that the evidence must be such 
that no conclusion can be drawn. It makes no sense 
for one to believe that his car will be able to get 
fifty miles per gallon of gasoline when the evidence 
is there that it just wontt do it. The first limitation, 
then, on the use of the volitional nature is that the 
desired condition is not refuted by experience or a 
preponderance of evidence. The next limitation which 
a proposition must be within before it should be 
asserted by our volitional nature is being a tgenuine 
option I. 
4Max H. Fisch (ed.), Classic American Philosophers 
(New York: Appleton-Century-crofts, Inc., 1951), 
p. 119. 
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An option, which is a proposition requiring a 
decision between two or more alternatives, may be, in 
James's terminology, of several kinds. It may be (1) 
living or dead; (2) forced or avoidable and (3) momen-
tous or trivial. 
(1) James borrows the language of electricity 
in referring to live or dead options. A live option is 
one that "makes a connection" with a person. For example, 
to most Westerners the command, "Believe in samsara", 
does not find much connection with them because they 
do not understand what samsara is and also because even 
upon understanding; it is foreign to their conceptual 
framework. However, to the same people the command, 
"Believe in heaven, hell and purgatory11 , will make a 
connection whether or not their own theology includes 
heaven, etc. It is important to notice that the live-
ness or deadness of an hypothesis.has nothing to do with 
the person's agreement with the hypothesis. Even to an 
atheist, the request to believe in God is a 11 live" 
request. Liveness has only to do with the individual's 
power to receive conviction, not the conviction itself. 
As James says: 
Deadness and liveness in an hypothesis are 
not intrinsic properties, but relations to the 
individual thinker.l 
lJames, pp. 2-3. 
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(2) Forced options are the kind in which it is 
impossible to avoid making a decision. For example, 
the option of either flying to Chicago or taking the 
train, may be avoided by driving and the option in ques-
tion is not forced. However, the option of either going 
to Chicago or not going to Chicago, cannot be avoided, 
and it is at that point forced. 
Every dilemma based on a complete logical 
disjunction, with no possibility of not choosing, 
is an option of this forced kind.l 
The forced option comes in the form of an 
exclusive alternation where a choice between alternatives 
must be made and where both alternatives may not be 
chosen. 
(3) Momentous options are the kind expressed 
by now or never. For example, in order to create 
tension in many popular motion pictures, the hero (or 
heroine) may tell the heroine (or hero) that they 
must get married either now or never. The tension is 
created bacause at least within the confines of that 
world, a momentous option is being imposed. The same 
type of option is often offered by a salesman who tells 
a customer to buy a particular item before the price 
1 ~•1 Po 3e 
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goes up the option may never be available again; 
thus it is momentous. A trivial option, on the 
other hand, is one which will be offered frequently. 
If, for example, I were to say, "Use your raincoat in 
Boston while you can", I would be offering a trivial 
option, for undoubtedly you will have many opportuni-
ties to use your raincoat in Boston. Per contra, if 
I say, "Enjoy Boston's sunshine while you can", 
that may be a momentous option. 
It is around James's analysis of options 
that he justifies the exercise of one's volitional 
nature. James says that "we may call an option a 
genuine option when it is of the forced, living, and 
momentous kind".l One is free to exercise his volitional 
nature at his own risk whenever the evidence is non-
conclusive and whenever there is a genuine option.2 
Thus, we can now see the full impact of an expansion 
of the quotation given above: 
1Ibid. (italics his). 
2For James's own approach to this topic, see: 
James, The Will to Believe, pp. 2 ffo 
for to say, under such circumstances, "Do not 
decide, but leave the question o~en". is itself 
a passional decisJ.on, -- .1ust 11 e decidirut ves 
or no, -- and is attended with t e same risk of 
losing the truth.l 
For James, religious options also fall within 
the sphere of our volitional nature, The faith-
tendency which arises naturally from his analysis, and 
which he feels may be properly exercised, may also 
be more clearly exemplified by his use of the •faith-
ladder' which has the following steps: 
1. There is nothing absurd in a certain view 
of the world being true, nothing self-contradictory; 
2. It might have been true under certain 
conditions; 
3o It may be true, even now; 
4· It is fit to be true; 
5. It ought to be true; 
6. It must be true; 
1· It shall be true, at any rate for ~.2 
Indeed, James never did make any clear distinc-
tion between religion and ethics and in Perry's 
biography of James, he labels one major section "Ethics 
1~., p. 11 (italics his). 
2william James, Some Problems of Philoso~hy 
(New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1924), P• 2 4. 
Also found in: William James, A Pluralistic Universe 
(New York: Longmans, Green and Co,, 1912), p. 329 
(italics his). 
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and Religion".l However, since this thesis is at 
least nominally concerned with James's ethics, I shall 
not defend explicitly the application of the criteria 
to religion. 
Before turning to the specific ethical impli-
cations contained in James's analysis, it is important 
to understand the relevance of this analysis for 
moral problems. Since James feels that science can 
only analyze what is, there is no evidence which 
science can give to conclusively support the moral 
worth of one alternative rather than another. Of 
course, given a goal (for example, to blow up the 
Russians), science may be able to tell us ~hat hypothe-
sis will fit the situation best, but in answering the 
more basic questions (for example, should we blow up 
the Russians), it cannct help. In James's own words: 
Moral questions immediately present them-
selves as questions whose solution cannot wait for 
sensible proof. A moral question is a question 
not of what sensibly exists, but of what is good, 
or would be good if it did exist. Science can 
tell us what exists; but to compare the worths, 
both of what exists and of what does not exist, 
we must consult not science, but what Pascal calls 
our heart.2 
lPerry, Thought and Character • . . , pp. 205-359. 
2James, The Will to Believe, p. 22. 
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Science and reason can, of course, develop evi• 
dence which may help analyze the alternatives involved 
in making a moral decision. Evidence is important to 
the making of moral decisions because it can make the 
alternatives clear. Indeed, it is possible that the 
evidence, when properly considered, may make one alterna-
tive very attractive, but the volitional nature must 
decide whether to yield to that attractiveness. I may 
be able to contemplate the probable results either of 
attempting to attack Russia or of not attempting to 
attack it. To the extent that reason helps me develop 
the evidence as to the consequences of mT decision, it 
should be appealed to. James is not attempting to say 
that we should not consider the evidence, quite to the 
contrary. What he is saying is that after all the evi-
dence is in and reason has gone as far as it can, we must 
use our volitional nature in making the decision. Reason 
can tell us that if we attempt to attack Russia, X may 
be the result, whereas, if we don't attempt to attack 
Russia, Y may be the result. However, reason cannot 
tell us which result to accept unless it is given another 
goal {maximization of life, for example). If we give 
reason the other goal, then it can make our decision, 
but the moral question returns as to whether we should 
accept that new goal. 
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Thus, in making moral decisions we have no 
conclusive evidence. The options, fUrthermore, are 
genuine because (1) they are live (we have the con-
ceptual ability to understand both moral and immoral 
acts; we can understand exceeding the speed limit even 
though we may not approve of it); (2) they are forced 
(we must choose either to obey a moral code or not); 
(3) they are momentous (we shall never get a chance to 
re-make our moral decisions; for example, if through 
careless driving I should injure someone, all the care~ 
ful driving I do in the fUture and all the sorrow I 
may feel will not in any way allow me to re-make my 
original decision). 
B. Ethical Implications of James's Analysis 
Ethical questions cannot be solved by science 
or evidence alone. Perry, in In the Spirit of William 
James, says: 
The principles by which the moral issue was 
to be settled were not the same as the principles 
employed by each party within its proper domain. 
Least of all was this issue to be settled by 
mathematics or laboratory experimentation.l 
And James himself in describing the psychological 
activity involved in making moral decisions says: 
1Perry, In The Spirit of ••• , p. 179. 
Tbe most characteristically and peculiarly 
moral judgments that a man is ever called on to 
make are in unprecedented cases and lonely emer-
gencies, where no popular rhetorical maxims can 
avail, and the hidden oracle alone can speak; 
and it speaks often in favor of conduct quite 
unusual, and suicidal as tar as gaining popular 
approbation goes.l 
Thus, while evidence is of primary importance, 
tor the "most characteristically and peculiarly moral 
judgments" evidence would once again seem to be non• 
conclusive. However, with the admission that the 
evidence used in making moral decisions is nonconclu-
sive and that still we must rely on evidence whenever 
possible, must go a changing ethical theory. It is 
impossible to make up an ethic in advance or the evi-
dence and then •deduce• all the individual principles. 
Rather any ethical theory it it is going to be rele-
vant to a human society must be ready to adjust itself 
to the evidence which grows out or that society's on-
going nature. James realizes that his reliance upon 
new evidence commits him to a dynamic ethic: 
There is no such thing possible as an ethical 
philosophy dogmatically made up in advance. There 
can be no final truth in ethics any more than in 
physics, until the last man has had his say.2 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
lwilliam James, The Principles or Pszcholofy 
(2 vola; New York: Dover Publications, Inc., l9SO , 
II, 672. 
2James, Will to Believe, P• 184. 
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All this amounts to saying that, so far as 
the casuistic question goes, ethical science is 
just like physical science, and instead of being 
deducible all at once from abstract principles, 
must simply bide its time, and be ready to revise 
its conclusions day to day.l 
Thus, evidence is of primary importance to 
James's ethics and he is willing, where possible, to 
rely on it. In order to complete the foundation of his 
ethical theory, we need only spell out in some more 
detail the further characteristics of an ethical act. 
James's best statement of the additional characteris-
tics of an ethical act appear in his Principles of 
Psychology: 
An act has no ethical quality whatever un-
less it be chosen out of several all equally 
possible • • • The ethical energy par excellence 
has to go farther and choose which interest out 
of several, equally coercive, shall become supreme 
• • • What[a person]shall become is fixed by 
the conduct of this moment.2 
The ethical decision comes as the result of a 
genuine option. It is live because either course of 
action can be actively entertained. It is forced 
because whether or not one commits the moral indiscre-
tion, a decision is unavoidable. And, finally, it is 
1~., p. 208. 
2James, The Principles of Psychology, I, 287 
(italics his). 
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momentous because the commission or not of the indis-
cretion may (indeed, probably will) influence what the 
person may become. James may then conclude that: 
We have learned that the words 'good', 'bad' 
and •obligation' mean no absolute natures, inde-
pendent of personal support. They are objects of 
feeling and desire which have no foothold or 
anchorage in Being, ap~t from the existence of 
actually living minds. 
In sum, the foundation on which James must 
build his ethical theory, is one which sees evidence 
as non-conclusive, the options entertained as genuine 
and ultimately a changing subjectivistic ethic. In the 
next chapter, James's basic ethical principles will be 
presented. However, it is important first to examine 
carefully some of the criticisms which have been 
developed in opposition to James's analysis of reason 
and volitional nature. 
c. Criticism of The Will to Believe 
In this section, some criticisms which have been 
offered against James's •will to believe• will be con-
sidered. First, I shall examine the most important 
types of criticism offered by people other than myself. 
1James, Will to Believe, P• 197. 
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These critic isms can be broken down into bro main 
categories; those who, in concentrating on his 
limitations of the use of the volitional nature, feel 
that he has so restricted faith that it is no longer 
really faith; and those who, in concentrating on his 
desire to get beyond reason feel that he is advocating 
a policy of believing in anything. The criticisms are 
typically against what their authors consider the 
religious implications of James's position to be. 
However, James made little or no real distinction 
between ethics and religion, and if the criticisneof 
his religious position "(Jrevail, then these criticisms 
may prevail against his ethical position also. Second, 
I shall present my own critical reflections on James's 
positions. I shall examine more closely his restric-
tions on the exercise of the volitional nature with 
a view to pointing up some of the difficulties involved. 
James has been attacked by religious and anti-
religious people alike. He has been accused of be-
lieving too much by some and of believing too little 
by others. I must confess before continuing with this 
examination, that I think most of the criticisms are 
weak and as James once said, they are aimed at the ill-
chosen title Will to Believe, rather than at the book 
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itself. 1 Some have attacked him because the will 
accounted for is not really an act of belief. Many 
others forget or completely ignore James's insis-
tence on the necessity of the non-conclusiveness of 
admissible evidence and, thus, criticize what they 
think is a doctrine of •wishing will make it so•. 
First, I shall allow John Jay Chapman and 
Santayana to represent those who felt that what James 
accounted for was not faith at all; second, I shall 
allow Walter Kaufman to represent those who criticize 
him for allowing too much belief. 
Perry in The Thought and Character of William 
James, says: 
Among the critics of The Will to Believe 
there was one [Chapman] , at least, who complained 
not of James's boldness but of his excessive 
caution.2 
Chapman in a letter to James says: 
235. 
The faith you talk about has been so justified 
and bolstered, and drugged up and down and ironed 
and wired -- damme if I call that faith!3 
1James, The Letters of William James, II, 87. 
2Perry, The Thought and Character • • . ' II, 
3 Ibid., II, 236. 
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Later, Santayana took up the same cudgels and 
made essentially the same complaint in a more sarcastic 
manner in his book Character and Opinion in the United 
States: 
He fJameiJ did not really believe; he 
merely b~ieved in the right of believing that 
you might be right if you believed.l 
These criticisms make a two-fold mistake. They 
ignore the fact that James stated that he was speaking 
to philosophic audiences who he felt had gone too far 
in rejecting the possibility of exercising the volitional 
nature. In replying to Chapman's complaint, James says: 
Damme if I call that faith, either. It is 
only calculated for the sickly hotbed atmosphere 
of the philosophic positivistically enlightened 
classroom. To the vactims of spinal paralysis 
which these studies superinduce, the homeopathic 
treatment, although you might not believe it 
really does good. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Read my Preface, if you have not read it.2 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
lGeorge Santayana, Character and Opinion in The 
?U~ni~te~d~S;.,;t:;;a;,:t"te""-s (Garden City, New York: Doubleday Anchor 
Books, 1954!, P• 47. 
2In the preface to the book, James says that the 
book was intended for philosophic audiences: James, 
The Will to Believe, p. vii ff. 
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I wish you knew a few of the intellects at 
whom that speech was delivered.l 
These criticisms also make the mistake of at 
least implying that the exercise of faith should be unre-
stricted. James thinks that such unrestricted faith 
would result in religious anarchy and he cannot con-
done that. Again, in his reply to Chapman he says: 
The trouble with your robust and full-bodied 
faiths, however, is, that they begin to cut each 
other's throats too soon, and for getting on in 
the world and establishing a modus vivendi these 
pestilential refinements and reasonablenesses and 
moderations have to creep in.2 
In sum, then, those who would criticize James 
for not allowing a more unfettered use of the volitional 
nature fail to understand that in addressing the philoso-
phic audiences, he felt that he was addressing people 
whose volitional natures had become so chained to 
'science' that they were unnecessarily taking the risk 
of losing truth. Furthermore, if faith is not to, some 
extent restricted, history is sufficient witness of the 
religious and political chaos that is the result. 
Walter Kaufman, on the other hand, criticizes 
1Perry, The Thought and Character ••• , II, 
237 (italics his). 
2
_!lli., II, 237 • 
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James's 1will to believe' because it allows too much 
freedom to the volitional nature. Kaufman is a good 
representative because he is a contemporary philosopher 
who, therefore, does not have much excuse for not under-
standing James's meaning since both Perry and James have 
made that meaning abundantly clear as we have seen above, 
and because Kaufman presents a fairly common objection 
in as brief and clear a manner as possible: 
James's apology for eccentric beliefs on the 
ground that after all they might conceivably be 
right, strikes at the roots of all intellectual 
discipline and the foundations of our civilization. 
When it came to his beloved "right to believe", 
he failed to grasp the distinction between a legal 
right and an intellectual right. Legally, I have 
the right to believe not only without sufficient 
evidence but even what is demonstrably false; and 
many of us are prepared to defend this right. 
But intellectually it is not reputable: indeed, 
it is proof of my irrationality. And while a 
great deal can be said for tolerance of irration-
ality by the state, no less can be said against 
tolerance of irrationality by philosophers.l 
The only proof of "irrationality" I can assent 
to here is Kaufman's "irrationality". He is being 
"irrational" in demanding conclusive evidence before 
assenting to a proposition, yet fails to grant that 
his demand is as surely grounded in volitional nature 
1walter Kaufman, Critique of Religion and 
Philosophy (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 
1958), PP• 93-94• 
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as James's demands are. James does not fail to distin-
guish between "intellectual" and "legal" rights. He is 
only talking about "intellectual" rights. He never 
advocates making the Salvation Army illegal, but he 
does say that their thoughts should be more well venti-
lated with scientific evidence. Kaufman's misunder-
standing of James is very apparent wherein he by impli-
cation accuses James of allowing that one has the in-
tellectual right to believe that which is demonstrably 
false. James's constant insistence upon not using the 
volitional nature when the evidence would make that 
faith demonstrably false is completely ignored by Kaufman. 
James does not want to apologize for eccentric beliefs. 
Nor does he wish, as Santayana says, that intellectual 
cripples and moral hunchbacks should not be jeered at.l 
He rather wants them all well criticized wherever evi-
dence can be found. At one point James says: 
281. 
Strange as it may sound, there can be little 
doubt that a good-natured scepticism and willing-
ness to let the devil have his head a bit, is 
for public purposes a better state of mind than 
too exalted a notion of one's duty towards the 
world.2 
1santayana, p. 46. 
2 Perry, The Thought and Character ••• , II, 
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And further: 
My essay ~'The Will to Believe~ hedged the 
license to indulge in private over-beliefs with 
so many restrictions and signboards of danger 
that the outlet was narrow enough.l 
It is clear that James's intent is not to allow 
all beliefs or acts of volitional nature to become 
operative, indeed it is because of his restrictions 
that Chapman and Santayana criticize him. However, 
James isn 1 t ready to adopt a position which would pre-
vent the volitional nature from having any voice in our 
decisions. We may, then, conclude with Perry: 
The ground of James's complaint is quite clear. 
He was accused of encouraging willfulness or 
wantoness of belief, or of advocating belief for 
belief's sake, whereas his whole purpose had been 
to justify belief • • • His critics had accused 
him of advocating license in belief, whereas, on 
the contrary, his aim had been to formulate rules 
for belief. Z 
Where the evidence does not demand a conclusion, 
it would seem both foolish and irrational to prevent us 
from engaging our volitional nature: 
248 
Are there not somewhere forced options in 
our speculative questions, and can we •• • always 
wait with impunity till the coercive evidence shall 
have arrived? It seems ~ priori improbable that 
1James, The Letters of William James, II, 207. 
2Perry, The Thought and Character ••• , II, 
(italics his). 
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the truth should be so nicely adjusted to our needs 
and powers as that. In the great boardinghouse 
of nature, the cakes and the butter and the syrup 
seldom come out so even and leave the plates so 
clean.l 
Far from defeating James, Kaufman merely mis-
understands him. Kaufman's choice is to play the part 
of sceptic, and for James that choice is as non-rational 
as his own; furthermore, Kaufman's option needlessly 
puts him in the position of losing truth when it may be 
available. The further point is that sometimes we 
cannot avoid making a decision and we need some criteria 
for making such decisions: 
There are inevitable occasions in life when 
inaction is a kind of action, and when not to be 
for is to be practically against. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Is not the duty of neutrality where only our 
inner interests would lead us to believe, the most 
ridiculous of commands? Is it not sheer dogmatic 
folly to say that our inner interests can have no 
real connection with the forces that the hidden 
world may contain?2 
The only reply to James which can be valid as 
I see it is either to assert that the cakes and the 
butter and the syrup do come out even in our life time 
lJames, The Will to Believe, p. 22 (italics his). 
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-- that evidence is always sufficient, or to advocate 
some other criteria. 
The choice, for James, is not between believing 
and knowing, but between believing too much or believing 
too little and as he says: 
There is really no scientific or other method 
by which men can steer safely between the opposite 
dangers of believing too much or of believing too 
little. To face such dangers is apparently our 
duty, and to hit the right channel between them 
is the measure of our wisdom as men.l 
And further: 
What proof is there that dupery through hope 
is so much worse than duper2 through fear? I, for 
one, can see no proof • •• 
It is important to remember, then, that when 
James.says: 
Would God ..J had never thought ~ that 
unhappy title e'The Will to Believe~ , but 
called it a "Critique of Pure Faith"~3 
the critique would not only be directed at the 11 pure 
faith" of the Salvation Army type, but also at the 
11pure faith" of Kaufman's type. It is apparent that 
the only sensible criticism one can make of James is 
1 Ibid., P• xi. 
2 Ibid., p. 27. 
3Perry, The Thought and Character • • . , II, 244. 
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either of his assertion that reason, as he defines it, 
is insufficient or of his criteria for going beyond 
reason. To criticize him on the first grounds, one 
would have to rely on either reason or non-reason; to 
criticize him on the second grounds, one would have to 
suggest new criteria. 
It would be both foolish and wrong, however, 
to think that James's analysis is completely free of 
questions and problems. I intend, now, to present my 
own reflections on his analysis in order to demonstrate 
some of the problems involved in a Jamesian approach. 
It seems to me that James's use of the genuine 
option is, in a large part, both useful and correct. 
The 1forcedness 1 of options is not only imperative, but 
also part of the very structure of ethical decisions. 
Time and energy can be foolishly wasted in an attempt 
to avoid making a decision. The momentous quality of 
ethical decisions seems to me to be a recognition of 
an important element. It should be obvious that if I 
choose to be a murderer today, that choice will influ• 
enc$ my whole life. James is unclear as to a specific 
definition of the 'liveness 1 or 'deadness' of an option. 
The example he uses is one of asking his audience of 
westerners to believe in the Mahdil and he says that such 
1 Ibid., P• 2. 
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a request would make no electrical connection. How-
ever, to an Arab whether or not he be a follower of 
Mahdi, the option is live. Suppose that I were talk-
ing to a follower of Mahdi and told him that I could 
not become a fellow-follower because the option made 
no live connection. He would reply, and I think 
correctly, that I should understand Mahdi well enough 
to become a follower. Indeed, isn't that at least 
one of the purposes of Christian missionary movements 
--to make Christianity a 'live option'? If, as a 
westerner, I agree that God is a live option, what then 
of His qualities? Is He all-good or all-evil, all 
powerful or powerless at some point, etc1 All these 
options seem to be 1 live 1 , yet if I am to believe in 
God, I must also believe in a God with some particular 
qualities. The problem is, then, that the option may 
not be between believing in God or not, but between 
believing in a God with particular qualities or not. 
Why, then, should the mere "liveness" of an option 
allow one to properly adopt a believing attitude toward 
a particular type of God or not? 
The live option can be saved, I think, but only 
if it is re-interpreted. It must be re-interpreted as 
a psychological condition under which belief is adopted 
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rather than a philosophic limitation of that adoption. 
The live option is meaningful only because under the 
conditions of a forced and momentous option, one is 
able to consider only the live option, by the definition 
of 'live'• By this same definition, one will consider 
all options which are live. For a cannibal, Kant's 
categorical imperative is not a live option, and he 
cannot be expected to obey it. One of the first duties 
of a moral philosopher, then, is to make his options 
live. The next chapter will present James's attempt 
to make his own options live. Once they are live, of 
course, if they are also forced and momentous, the 
volitional nature is properly operative. 
At a cursory reading, it would seem that 
James's further requirement of the non-conclusive nature 
of evidence is in conflict with his apparent willingness 
to rely on evidence. This is only an apparent conflict, 
not a real one. James is not only willing to rely on 
evidence for his decisions wherever applicable, but also 
was an active participant in the search for evidence. 
The real problem, however, is that what should be at 
question is not the evidence itself, but a criterion by 
which one can decide which evidence is conclusive and 
which is non-conclusive. Essentially, the difficulty 
is one of defining terms and providing a theory of 
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conclusiveness (inductive and/or deductive); James does 
neither of these, at least within the confines of his 
radical empiricism. He rather assumes that there will 
be essential agreement as to which questions are debat-
able and which are not. For example, he takes for granted 
the fact that neither the question of the existence of 
God nor the question of free-will have sufficient ev1• 
dence to support a conclusion. Needless to say, many 
philosophers would disagree with him. Granted his 
pragmatism may be some help here, he will have to go 
beyond the confines of his radical empiricism to seek 
that support. If he wants to stay strictly within his 
doctrine of radical empiricism, he has admitted a 
serious insufficiency by not providing us with the 
criterion needed. 
Furthermore, while a pragmatic doctrine of mean-
ing might be helpful for James at this point, it may be 
challenged as insufficient in determing a criterion for 
the sufficiency of evidence. Before a philosophy of 
religion based on James's claims can become operative, 
it must deal with and provide an answer for this prob-
lem. However, I don't think the same problem exists 
in an attempt to determine an ethical philosophy. James 
definitely feels that the evidence for making moral 
decisions is non-conclusive and he states the grounds 
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for his feeling: 
Moral questions immediately present themselves 
as questions whose solution cannot wait for sensi-
ble proof. A moral question is a question not of 
what sensibly exists, but of what is good, or 
would be good if it did exist. Science can tell 
us what exists; but to compare the worths, both of 
what exists and of what does not exist, we must 
not consult science, but what Pascal calls our 
heart. • • • The question of having moral beliefs 
at all or not having them is decided by our will. 
• • • If your heart does not want a world of moral 
reality, your head will assure~never make you 
believe in one .1 
I feel that James is right in asserting that 
science and/or reason is finally incapable of making 
moral decisions. FOr example, both science and reason 
may be able to give me an innumerable amount of economic 
facts as to whether I should purchase one car rather 
than another and in each comparison one may be cheaper 
than the other, but neither can finally make my decision 
for me because neither can tell me how much some of 
the non-economic factors may be worth to me. Similarly, 
science and reason may be able to provide us with an 
abundance of information as to the results of particu-
lar moral alternatives we are considering, but neither 
can decide which of the consequences we should accept. 
Science and reason can analyze what exists, and to that 
lJames, The Will to Believe, pp. 22-23 (italics 
his). 
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extent a philosophy of religion must square with them; 
but neither can make our ultimate moral decisions and 
we must use our volitional nature. In the next chapter 
we shall see how James exercises his volitional nature 
in trying to make live the basic principles of his 
ethical theory. 
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CHAPTER IV 
BASIC PRINCIPLES OF JAMES'S 
ETHICAL THIDRY 
This chapter will build ~pon the foundation laid 
by the last two chapters. Initially, it will consider 
the problem of free-will, which is both an ethical and 
metaphysical problem. The psychological and meta-
physical implications involved in a resolution of this 
problem necessitate going beyond the confines of ~ 
Will to Believe for final support. The solution of this 
problem by James is of paramount importance to his 
ethical scheme. In a second section, James's treatment 
of the casuistic question will be presented. It is 
through his solution of the casuistic question and the 
• 
free-will problem that the importance of moral individ-
ualism is developed. The principles of moral individ-
ualism will be explicated, therefore, in the third sec-
tion. In the last section, James's insistence upon the 
reality of evil will be examined. His moral individ-
ualism and his refusal to subsume evil under an absolute 
category of good made his call for and example of "moral 
heroism" evident. The call and example will be the 
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subject of the fifth chapter of this thesis. 
A. The Problem of Determinism 
Before discussing James's support of indeter-
minism, it is necessary to understand what he means by 
the terms 'determinism' and 'indeterminism' and what 
position he is not to be associated with. James defines 
determinism and indeterminism as follows: 
{j)eterminisxill professes that those parts of 
the universe already laid down absolutely appoint 
and decree what the other parts shall be. The 
future has no ambiguous possibilities hidden in 
its womb: the part we call the present is com-
patible with only one totality.l 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Indeterminism, on the contrary, says that the 
parts have a certain amount of loose play on one 
another, so that the laying down of one of them 
does not necessarily determine what the others 
shall be.2 
As James sees it, at least part of the determinism-
indeterminism controversy has been caused by each side 
accusing the other of taking an extreme position. His 
version of indeterminism is not to be accused of causing 
an absolute disconnectedness between the parts of the 
lJames, The Will to Believe, p. 150. 
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universe such that anything may happen at any time --
rather, there is a certain amount of loose play between 
the elements of the universe: 
Professor Taylor is so na1f in this habit of 
thinking only in extremes that he charges the 
pluralists with cutting the ground from under their 
own feet in not consistently following it them-
selves., What pluralists say is that a universe 
really connected loosely, after the pattern of 
our daily experience, is possible, and that for 
certain reasons it is the hypothesis to be pre-
ferred. What Professor Taylor thinks they naturally 
must or should say is that any other sort of 
universe is logically impossible, and that a 
totality of things interrelated like the world of 
the monists is not an hypothesis that can be ser-
iously thought out at all. Meanwhile no sensible 
pluralist ever flies or wants to fly to this dog-
matic extreme.l 
If chance is spoken of as an ingredient of 
the universe, absolutists interpret it to mean 
that double sevens are as likely to be thrown 
out of a dice box as double sixes are. If free-
will is spoken of, that must mean that an english 
general is as likely to eat his prisoners to-day 
(sic.) as a Maori chief was a hundred years ago. 
It is as likely -- I am using Mctaggart's examples 
-- that a majority of Londoners will burn them-
selves alive to-morrow (sic.) as that they will 
partake of food, as likely that I shall be hanged 
for brushing my hair as for committing a murder, 
and so forth, through various suppositions that 
no indeterminist ever sees real reason to make.2 
lJames, A Pluralistic Universe, pp. 76-77• 
The argument which James is contradicting can be found 
in Taylor's Elements of Metaphysics. 
2Ibid., p. 77. McTaggart's examples can be 
found in his book, ::S~o:!!m~e~D~o~gm:e;a::::s~o=f...:.:R~e:..::l:::i:J:g.:i:.::o~n. 
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• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
The commonest vice or the human mind is its 
disposition to see everything as yes or no, as 
black or white, its incapacity for discrimination 
or intermediate shades.l 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
How often have I been replied to, when ex-
pressing doubts of the logical necessity of the 
absolute, or flying to the opposite extreme: 
'But surely, surely there must be some connexion 
among things~' As if I must necessarily be an 
uncontrolled monomaniac insanely denying any 
connexion whatever. The whole question revolves 
in very truth about the word 1some'• Radical 
empiricism and pluralism stand out for the legit-
imacy or the notion or some: each part or the 
world is in some ways connected,in some other ways 
not connected with its other parts, and the ways 
can be discriminated, for many or them are obvious, 
and their differences, are obvious to view. Abso-
lutism, on its side, seems to hold that 'some' is 
a category ruinously infected with self-contradictor-
iness, and that the only categories inwardly con-
sistent and therefore pertinent to reality are 
'all' and 'nonet.2 
I shall return later to the metaphysical impli-
cations or James's solution to the free-will problem; 
the point to be retained at the moment is of the kind 
or indeterminism James will defend. He clearly wants 
to avoid being accused or setting the parts or the 
universe so free from one another that all meaningful 
relations and connectedness are abolished. 
1Ibid., PP• 77-78. 
2Ibid., pp. 78-79 (italics his). 
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For James, indeterminism and continuity are 
not mutually exclusive categories: 
The world, in short, is just as continuous 
with itselr for the believers in free will as for 
the rigorous determinists, only the latter are 
unable to believe in points of birurcation as 
spots or really indifferent equilibrium or as con-
taining shunts which there -- and there only, not 
berore -- direct existing motions without altering 
their amount.l 
As a matter of fact, James goes quite a long 
way in making concessions to the determinists. He 
recognizes the fact that to some extent we are all sub-
ject to psychological continuity and in his Principles 
of Psychology, he readily admits the fact that at some 
points, we are determined creatures. In the chapter on 
11 Habi t 11 , he says: 
"Habit a second nature! Habit is ten times 
nature", the Duke or Wellington is said to have 
exclaimed; and the degree to which this is true 
no one can probably appreciate as well as one who 
is a veteran soldier himselr. The daily drill and 
the years or discipline end by rashioning a man 
completely over again, as to most or the possibili-
ties or his conduct. • • • It is well ror the 
world that in most or us, by the age or thirty, 
the character has set like plaster, and will never 
sorten again.2 
And in the chapter on "Reasoning" he makes the same 
point: 
lJames, The Meaning or Truth, P• 252. 
2James, Principles of Psychology, I, 120-121. 
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Though many general characters or the world 
seem indirrerent to each other, there remain a 
number or them which arrect constant habits or 
mutual concomitance or repugange (sic.). They in-
volve or imply each other. One or them is a sign 
to us that the other will be round. They hunt 
in couples, as it were; and such a proposition as 
that M is P, or includes P, or precedes or 
accompanies P, ir it prove to be true in one in-
stance, may very likely be true in every other in-
stance which we meet. This is, in ract, a world 
in which general laws obtain, in which universal 
propositions are true, and in which reasoning is 
thererore possible.l 
It may appear as ir James is trying "to have 
his cake and eat it too"; to have rreedom and still some 
dependable psychological theories. I don't think this 
is the case. Ir the choice must be between a world in 
which no human actions are connected to any others and 
a world in which all human actions are determined berore 
they are taken, empirical racts would seem to demand 
the latter ror while I am not able to predict all the 
activities or a particular person, certain stimuli do 
seem to evoke similar responses, so there must be some 
connectedness. However, the exclusive disjunction 
orrered does not seem to be the only possibility. I 
can see no inconsistency in saying that while I recog-
nize a great deal or consistency and continuity in my 
lire and actions, there may be points at which that 
1Ibid., II, 337• 
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general pattern is interrupted and I am indeed free to 
choose. James quotes G. s. FUllerton on this point, 
and I think FUllerton states the position clearly: 
The most ardent free-willist will, when he 
contemplates it frankly, excuse me for hoping that 
if I am free I am at least not very free, and 
that I may reasonably expect to find some degree 
of consistency in my life and actions.l 
Of course, the above is not in any manner in-
tended to be an argument which would support a belief 
in free-will, but rather it is an argument which des-
troys any attempt to say that James's position is a 
contradiction in terms. James's argument, that the 
kind of indeterminism he has defined does in fact exist, 
will be taken up next. 
Before examining the argument itself, it is 
important to establish two points. The first is that 
the evidence to support either the determinists or the 
indeterminists is non-conclusive, and the volitional 
nature is thus properly operative. The second is the 
pattern of James's argument especially in light of the 
non-conclusive nature of evidence. 
On the first point, James says: 
We have not yet ascertained whether this be 
a world of eha .. e or no; at most, we have agreed 
1James, A Pluralistic Universe, p. 79. 
that it seems so, And I now repeat what I said 
at the outset, that, from any strict theoretical 
point of view, the guestion is insoluble,! 
And further: 
Evidence of an external kind to decide between 
determinism and indeterminism is, as I intimated 
a while back, strictly impossible to find,2 
Again: 
I thus disclaim openly on the threshold all 
pretension to p1•ove to you that the freedom of 
the will is true, The most I hope is to induce 
some of you to follow my own example in assuming 
it true, and acting as if it were true,3 
In Chapter III, we had to conclude that James's 
claim for the insufficiency of evidence in solving cer-
tain problems requires that he go outside the confines 
of his radical empiricism and give us some criterion for 
determining when evidence is sufficient and when it is 
not, The same problem arises here and in conjunction 
with the second half of this point which is that the 
volitional nature may be operative, some solution 
must be sought. The solution cannot be made by staying 
within the radical empiricism because expressions such 
as •to decide between•, •follow my example in assuming 
IJames, The Will to Believe, p. 159. 
2l£l.£.' p. 150. 
3Ibid. I P• 146. 
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it true•, and •volitional nature may be operative• 
already pre-suppose an indeterministic scheme. Ir one 
has the choice to decide between determinism and in-
determinism, then indeterminism is the only sensible 
alternative to choose. James's whole radical empiri-
cism is based on the •will to believe•, yet to state 
that one has the will to believe one way or another, is 
to make determinism a dead option berore examination. 
There is, I think, a way out or this problem, 
however, -- by appealing to metaphysics. It is impossi-
ble to attempt a resolution or the rree-will problem 
without implicating a metaphysic. It is beyond the 
scope or this thesis to argue and support James's 
pluralistic metaphysics ror two reasons. First, he had 
not rormally established pluralism at the time he wrote 
The Will to Believe and second, it is not necessary 
to argue the establishment or his pluralism in order to 
understand the metaphysics which underlies the volitional 
nature. It will be helprul to re-rormulate his meta-
physics as it appears in The Pluralistic Universe: 
For pluralism, all that we are required to 
admit as the constitution or reality is what we 
ourselves rind empirically realized in every 
minimum or rinite lire. Brierly it is this, 
that nothing real is absolutely simple, that every 
smallest bit or experience is multum !£ parvo 
plurally related, that each relation is one aspect, 
character, or runction, way or its being taken, or 
way or taking something else; and that a bit or 
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reality when actively engaged in one of these 
relations is not by that very fact engaged in all 
the other relations simultaneously. The relations 
are not all what the French call solidaires with 
one another. Without losing its identity a thing 
can either take up or drop another thing, like the 
log I spoke of, which by taking up new carriers 
and dropping old ones can travel anywhere with a 
light escort. 
For monism, on the contrary, everything, 
whether we realize it or not, drags the whole 
universe along with itself and drops nothing. The 
log starts and arrives with all its carriers sup-
porting it. If a thing were once disconnected, it 
could never be connected again, according to monism.l 
And further: 
Here, then, you have the plain alternative, 
and the full mystery of the difference between 
pluralism and monism, as clearly as I can set it 
forth on this occasion. It packs up into a nut-
shell: -- Is the manyness in oneness that in-
dubitably characterizes the world we inhabit, a 
property only of the absolute whole of things, 
so that you must postulate that one-enormous-
whole indivisibly as the prius of there being 
any many at all -- in other words, start with the 
rationalistic block-universe, entire, unmitigated, 
and complete? -- or can the finite elements have 
their own aboriginal form of manyness in oneness, 
and where they have no immediate oneness still be 
continued into one another by intermediary terms 
each one of these terms being one with its next 
neighbors, and yet the total •oneness' never 
getting absolutely complete?2 
This metaphysical view must, then, be related 
to our problem. If pluralism is an adequate metaphysic, 
then there is no one point of view which can take in 
lJames, A Pluralistic Universe, PP• 322-323. 
2~. 1 PP• 326-327. 
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all the information and make a final decision as to 
freedom or non-freedom, indeed there can be no final 
decision until all the evidence is in and we must be 
ready to revise our conclusions day-to-day.l Further-
more, the determinism-indeterminism controversy meets 
James's condition for a genuine option. Whether or 
not the volitional nature is psychologically pre-
determined to make a decision as to its affinity to 
determinism or indeterminism makes little difference. 
The whole point of James's argument is to persuade us 
to adopt his indeterministic attitude and to assume 
indeterminism. Our having no choice is unimportant; 
the assumption we adopt is what is important, not how 
it is adopted in the pluralistic view. The request to 
exercise the volitional nature is not involved in cir-
cularity, and once pluralism is granted, it is a mean-
ingful question. Thus, Perry is right when he says: 
He (.Tames] is concerned not so much to reject 
determinism, in general as to reject a monistic 
determinism, in which the world, being all of one 
piece, must be approved or condemned as a unit.2 
Before I become involved in justifying James's 
IJames makes this same point in The Will to 
Believe, p. 184. 
2Perry, The Thought and Character ••• , 
II, 212. 
73 
claim that the volitional nature is properly operative 
in deciding between freedom and determinism, I said 
that there is a second point which must be explained 
before examining James's argument itself, This second 
point is about the pattern of James's argument, The 
pattern of James's argument follows the form of a 
reductio ad absurdum, but not completely, 
The traditional reductio ~ absurdum argument 
assumes the opposite of what is to be proven and shows 
it leads deductively to a contradiction,l Russell and 
Whitehead symbolize it as: 
(P~-p)?-p 
in the propositional calculus and call it the principle 
of reductio ad absurdum, 
In James's adaptation, he does assume the oppos-
ite (determinism) of what he wants to prove, but rather 
than reducing it to a contradiction, he merely shows 
the undesirability of holding on to it, There is, of 
course, a problem with this form of argument as can be 
seen by the example of Gerolamo Saccheri who attempted 
a similar procedure with Euclid's parallel postulate, 
lcf, Joseph G, Brennan, A Handbook of Logic 
(New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957), P• 143. 
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Saccheri deduced what he thought was an absurd (but 
not contradictory) result and decided Euclid was right, 
However, since his time, non-Euclidean Geometry has 
shown not only the possibility of abandoning the para-
llel postulate, but also the utility of doing so in 
certain circumstances,l However, our purposes in decid-
ing between free-will and determinism may well be 
served by following James's argument. In the first 
place, our purpose is not to prove the independence 
or inter-dependence of our axioms and form an elegant 
deductive sys tern. In the second place, if deter'Illinisll! 
:!.s really an unattractive or absurd assumption, it wol<.ld 
be an indication of wanton and foolish stubborness to 
maintain it, The purpose and pattern of J~~es•s argu-
ment will be to show the unattractiveness of determinism, 
There is a word which if left undefined might 
make James's rejection of determinism appear ambiguous. 
That word is 1chance 1 ; "Chance", James says, "means only 
the negative fact that no part of the world, however 
big, can claim to control absolutely the destinies of 
the whole",2 This Hord has a negative connotation for 
The 
lcf. Irving M. Copi, Symbolic Lofic (New York: 
Macmillan Company, 1954), pp. 173-17 • 
2James•s indebtedness to Peirce's doctrine of 
Tychism is obvious and noted by James in The Will to 
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James, it indicates the bifurcation of the parts of 
the universe rather than a positive force. He aban-
dons the term 'freedom' because it has been adopted 
by both sides of the controversy to the extent that 
it has a completely ambiguous meaning.l 
The determinist is in the unhappy position of 
being caught between the horns of a dilemma -- either 
he must become a pessimist or he must become a sub-
jectivist if he is to escape the dilemma with his 
determinism intact. James elaborates this theme as 
follows: 
There are times when we are called upon to 
regret the existence of a certain state of affairs. 
For example, suppose that there has been a murder; we 
may find ourselves in the position of saying that is 
is too bad that the murder occurred. However, by the 
determinis11s o·.,n scheme, 1;o admit that the universe 
could have been otherwise (without the murder) is to 
Believe, p. 145n. Fbr Peirce's own view,cf. especially, 
Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (eds.), Collected 
Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce (Cambridge: The 
Belknap Press, 1960), 6.47. 
ls. H. Hodgson in his Time and Space calls 
himself a •free-will determinist!. James, The Will 
to Believe, p. 149. 
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make a suicide of reason. Yet if the murder is pre-
determined by the rest of the universe, can we stick 
to our original judgment of regret and say that though 
it was impossible for it to be otherwise, it would 
have been a better universe without it in it? Given 
the universe at hand, it is impossible for the murder 
not to have happened and our regret over the murder 
alone will transform itself into a larger regret. 
There is a way to avoid such pessimism, however, 
and it is to abandon the judgment of regret. But 
when the judgment of regret is abandoned, the deter-
minist is in a logical predicament. Regret implies 
that things might have been otherwise. But in a 
deterministic world, both the regretted act and the 
regret itself are necessary, If regret is bad because 
it holds that the impossible ought to be, then since 
the judgment of regret is necessary, it must be good. 
James concludes: 
When murders and treacheries cease to be 
sins, regrets are theoretic absurdities and 
errors. The theoretic and the active life thus 
play a kind of see-saw with each other on the 
ground of evil. The rise of either sends the 
other down. Murder and treachery cannot be good 
without regret being bad; regret cannot be good 
without murder and treachery being bad. Both, 
however, are supposed to have been foredoomed; so 
something must be fatally unreasonable, absurd 
and wrong in the world.l 
lrbid., PP· 163-164. 
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There is an alternative to the pessimism which 
might accompany determinism. That alternative is sub-
jectivism: 
The world must not be regarded as a machine 
whose final purpose is the making real of any 
outward good, but rather as a contrivance for 
deepening the theoretic consciousness of what 
goodness and evil in their intrinsic natures are. 
Not the doing either of good or of evil is what 
nature cares for, but the knowing of them,l 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Subjectivism has three great branches, we may 
call them scientificism, sentimentalism, and 
sensualism, respectively. They all agree essen-
tially about the universe, in deeming that what 
happens there ~s subsidiary to what we think or 
feel about it. 
Subjectivism is a doctrine which states that 
moral values represent subjective feelings and reactions 
of individuals minds and that the values have no real 
status apart from those minds.3 
The determinist, then is caught in a quandary, 
either he must adopt a pessimistic view of the world, 
or he must leave off consideration of his judgments of 
libid., p. 165. 
2rbid. 
3Edward Westermarck is often cited for his 
defense of subjectivism in Ethical Relativity and ~ 
Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas, 
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the world as re£lecting the reality o£ the situation: 
The dilemma o£ determinism is one whose le£t 
horn is pessimism and whose right horn is subjec-
tivism. In other words, i£ determinism is to es-
cape pessimism, it must leave o££ looking at the 
goods and ills o£ li£e in a simple objective way, 
and regard them as materials indi££erent in them-
selves, £or the production o£ consciousness, 
scienti£ic and ethical, in us.l 
James is not ready to adopt a pessimistic view 
toward the world. Consistent with his recognition that 
the denial o£ such a view is £undamentally volitional, 
he says: 
To a reader who says he is satis£ied with 
a pessimism, and has no objection to thinking the 
whole bad, I have no more to say: he makes fewer 
demands on the world than I, who, making them, 
wish to look a little £urther before I give up all 
hope o£ having them satis£ied. I£, however, all 
he means is that the badness o£ some parts does 
not prevent his acceptance o£ a universe whose 
other parts give him satis£action, I welcome him 
as an ally.2 
As to the possibility o£ escaping the dilemma 
by choosing the horn o£ subjectivism, James has this 
to say: 
All through history we £ind how subjectivism, 
as soon as it has a £ree career, exhausts itsel£ 
in every sort o£ spiritual, moral, and practical 
license. Its optimism turns to an ethical indi£f-
erence, which infallibly brings dissolution in 
its train.3 
lJames, The Will to Believe, p. 166. 
2Ibid., p. 167n (italics his). 
3Ibid., P• 171. 
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The rejection of subjectivism, then, as breed-
ing ethical indifference and the rejection of determin-
ism, brings Ja~es to accept indeterminism and to assert 
at least by implication that pluralism and indeterminism 
are allies: 
The only consistent way of representing a 
pluralism and a world whose parts may affect one 
another through their conduct being either good 
or bad is the indeterministic way.l 
And further: 
The indeterminism I defend • • • represents 
that world as vulnerable, and liable to be in-jured by certain of its parts if they act wrong 
• • • • It gives us a pluralistic, restless 
universe, in which no single ~oint of view can 
ever take in the whole scene.2 
We may conclude, then, with James that the 
postulate of freedom is a moral postulate. And he 
accepts the principle of freedom on just such grounds. 
11 An act has no ethical quality whatsoever unless it be 
chosen out of several all equally possible 11 3 and: 
In the universe of Hegel -- the absolute 
block whose parts have no loose play, the pure 
plethora of necessary being with the oxygen 
of possibility all suffocated out of its lungs--
there can be neither good nor bad, but one dead 
1!.12..!.£. • p. 17 5. 
2Ibid., pp. 176-177. 
3James, Principles of Psychology, I, 287. 
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level of mere fate.l 
As we saw previously in defining James's terms, 
if indeterminism and chance are to be admitted into 
the world, it does not follow that the universe will 
thereby fall to pieces. By way of conclusion, we may 
say that James makes many concessions to the determin-
ist, but leaves a loop hole for freedom: 
But what, quite as much as the inconceivabil-
ity of absolutely independent variables, persuades 
modern men of science that their efforts must be 
predetermined, is the continuity of the latter 
with other phenomena whose predetermination no one 
doubts. Decisions with effort merge so gradually 
into those without it that it is not easy to say 
where the limit lies. Decisions without effort 
merge again into ideo-motor, and these into re-
flex acts; so that the temptation is almost 
irresistible to throw the formula which covers so 
many cases over absolutely all.2 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Psychology will be Psychology, and Science 
Science, as much as ever (as much and no more) in 
this world, whether free-will be true in it or 
not. Science, however, must be constantly reminded 
that her purposes are not the only purposes, and 
that the order of uniform causation which she has 
use for, and is therefore right in postulating, may 
be enveloped in a wider order, on which she has 
no claims at all.3 
1James, The Will to Believe, p. 292. 
2James, Principles of Psychology, II, 574-575. 
3 !£!!!., 576. 
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B. The Casuistic Question 
The purpose of this section is to present James's 
solution to the casuistic problem. First his definition 
of what the casuistic question or problem is will be 
given. Then his solution will be presented. In the 
two final sections areas of possible misconception will 
be cleared up and the historical context of his solution 
will be presented. 
In defining the casuistic question, James says: 
The casuistic question asks what is the measure 
of the various goods and ills which men recognize, 
so that the philosopher may settle the true order 
of human obligations~l 
For James, casuistry, is a method or criterion 
for solving conflicts of obligation. The purpose is 
to have a scale of obligation so that whenever an 
ethical conflict occurs, one may determine which obli-
gation should have greater allegiance and which less. 
In sections B and C of Chapter III of this 
thesis, we examined James's contention that ethical 
decisions are properly made on the basis of the voli-
tional nature. We saw that the evidence in ethical 
1James, The Will to Believe, p. 185 (italics 
his). 
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decisions is non-conclusive and that the option is 
genuine. It is important to recall that information 
in order to understand James's first contention that 
in the matter of casuistry we will not be sceptics: 
So far as the casuistic question goes, ethical 
science is just like physical science and instead 
of being deducible all at once from abstract 
principles, must simply bide its time, and be 
ready to revise its conclusions from day to day.l 
The problem or dilemma, James feels, is to 
avoid this scepticism on the one hand and on the other, 
to avoid merely establishing a personal, uncritical 
standard. Scepticism must be avoided because a forced, 
momentous option demands a decision. While an in-
tellectual decision may be avoided, if the option is 
forced, one must act and in acting the decision will 
be made. The standard, or test, James says, must be 
incarnate in the demand of some person, yet how can we 
ascertain the standard? Historically, he thinks, there 
has been a test used by the more serious ethical schools: 
If it were found that all goods gua goods 
contained a common essence, then the amount of this 
essence involved in any one good would show its 
rank in the scale of goodness, and order could 
be quickly made; for this essence would be the 
good upon which all thinkers were agreed, the re-
latively objective and universal good that the 
1Ibid., P• 208. 
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philosopher seeks.l 
There is, however, a problem with this system. 
It is an historical fact that many "essences of good" 
have been proposed. They have included such divergent 
essences as Aristotle's doctrine of the golden mean to 
the Christian reliance upon the will of God to the 
social contract of Hobbes. No one measure has given 
general satisfaction and James feels that the reason 
is that they have all been too narrow. In seeking for 
the most universal principle, he thinks, we are in-
evitably lead to the conclusion that the most universal 
principle is "that the essence of good is simply to 
satisfy demand" and "The demand may be for anything 
under the aun".2 
James realizes that with the above formulation 
his problema are not all over. He goes on to point 
out that the beat world would be one in which all demands 
are satisfied, but that is impossible. There are times 
when demands must come into conflict with one another, 
and we now need a way to decide on what basis those 
demands should be either frustrated or satisfied. His 
1Ibid., p. 200 (italics his). 
2 Ibid., P• 201. 
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conclusion is: 
Since everything which is demanded is by that 
£act a good, must not the guiding principle for 
ethical philosophy (since all demands conjointly 
cannot be satisfied in this poor world) be simply 
to satis£y at all times as many demands as we can? 
That act must be the best, accordingly, which makes 
for the best whole, in the sense o£ awakening the 
least sum of dissatis£actions. In the casuistic 
scale, there£ore, those ideals must be written 
highest which lrevail at the least cost, or by 
whose realizat on the least possible number o£ 
other ideals are destroyed.l 
And finally: 
There is but one unconditional commandment, 
which is that we should seek incessantly, with 
£ear and trembling, so to vote and to act as to 
bring about the very l~rgest total universe of 
good which we can see. 
James's £eeling that the judgment of an ethical 
act must be in terms o£ the total amount o£ demand it 
satis£ied, causes V. L. Butter£ield to call this an 
ethic of inclusiveness3; however, Perry points out 
that the most important element o£ this principle is 
the individual: 
1~., p. 205 (italics his). 
2Ibid., p. 209. Another formulation of the 
same position which James drew up in his notes for an 
ethics course (Philosophy 4) at Harvard can be found 
in Perry, The Thought and Character ••• , II, 263-26.5. 
3v. L. Butterfield, "The Ethics of William James" 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 
193.5) 1 Po 167 o 
8.5 
The principle is clear: value derives 
ultimately from the interests of the individual; 
and the social whole is justified by the inclu-
sion and reconciliation of its individual parts. 
Individualism is fundamental.l 
There are two points of possible confusion which 
must be cleared up before the argument can be properly 
understood. The first point is that although this prin-
ciple is in a sense a quantitative one, in its attempt 
to preserve as many goods as possible, James does not 
want it to be a mere calculus. No one is more aware of 
the organic nature of mind and society than James. 
The factor of quality plays an ultimate role in the 
moral scheme of things for James, but in a rough manner 
we can determine which act will yield the greatest 
satisfaction of demand. 
The second point that must be clarified is that 
James's use of the term 'least cost• is not an attempt 
to say that the achievement of an ideal requires little 
or no cost in the sense of energy and effort. He def-
initely does not mean that those ideals are highest 
which are easiest to attain. What he does mean is 
that we should strive to create a condition in which 
there is the least amount of dissatisfied demand. The 
attempt to achieve that condition may require an expend-
lPerry, Thought and Character •• • , II, 265. 
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iture of a great deal of effort on the part of any one 
individual, however, In the Principles of Psychology 
he says: 
And if a brief definition of ideal or 
moral action were required, none could be given 
which would better fit the appearances than this: 
It is action in the line of the greatest resistance.! 
The point is that as individuals, we may often 
be called upon to act in the line of the greatest re-
sistance for ourselves while creating a conditio~ of 
the least resistance for the whole. 
The historical context of James's position 
should be obvious. His indebtedness to the utilitar-
ians, especially John Stuart Mill, is admitted by James. 
He even dedicated his Pragmatism to Mill. The follow-
ing passage from Bentham 1 s Principles of Mol's.ls and 
Legislation is quite similar to a passage quoted from 
Perry above2 and demonstrates James's inheritance from 
Bentham: 
IV The interest of the co~~;unity is one of 
the most general expressions that can occur in 
the phraseology of morals: no wonder that the 
meaning of it is often lost. When it has meaning, 
it is this. The commurity is a fictitious body, 
lJames, Principles of Psychology, II, 549. 
2see above, P• 84. 
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composed of the individual persons who are con-
sidered as constituting as it were its members. 
The interest of the community then is, what? --
the sum of the interests of the several members 
who compose it. 
V It is in vain to talk of the interest of 
the community, without understandipg what is the 
interest of the individual • • •• 1 
Herbert w. Schneider in an essay about James's 
moral theory makes a very useful comparison between 
James and some of his contemporaries: 
This ~ames's principle to satisfy as many 
demands as we canJ is obviously a restatement of 
Royce's "moral insight".2 James shared Royce's 
ethics of loyalty, but not his "loyalty to loyalty" 
formula. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Regarding Jame~1 s exposition of moral obliga-
tion in this essay L"The Moral Philosopher and the 
Moral Lite"] , Dewey acknowledged in a letter to 
him his indebtedness to James's emphasis on de 
facto claims. This in Dewey and Tufts' Ethics and 
in Perry's theory of value became the basis of a 
social theory of moral obligation. By others, 
notably by Howison, this same idea was developed 
into a personalistic theism. But James himself 
developed it in neither direction, though he 
recognized the logical possibilities. He empha-
sized instead its implications for individualistic 
moral democracy.3 
lJeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Princi-
ples of Morals and Le~islation (Oxford: Tb8 Clarendon 
Press, 1823), P• 3. 
2James admits that it is in Perry, The Thought 
and Character ••• , II, 264. 
3Herbert w. Schneider, "William James as a 
Moralist," In Commemoration of William James (New York: 
Columbia University press, 1942), p. 138. 
88 
No one has seen fit to attack James's princi-
ple of inclusiveness directly. This is not due nec-
essarily to the fact that it cannot be attacked as to 
the fact that James is not recognized as an ethicist. 
FUrthermore, while James•s principle is a new formula-
tion, it does not represent a radical innovation beyond 
Mill's utilitarian liberalism and a valid criticism 
of that theory will be damaging to James. There are 
many criticisms of utilitarianism which have been ad-
vanced by authors as divergent in philosophic interest 
as Russell,l Nietzsche,2 Ayer,3 R. M. Hare4 and Moore.5 
I am not going to reply to or "defend" James from these 
criticisms for three reasons. In the first place, 
James makes no reply to any of the criticisms of utili-
tarianism, and I would be forced to say what I think 
James would say by way of reply. The ethical theory we 
lBertrand Russell, A Histor! of Western Philosophy 
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 194 ), pp. 778ft. 
2Friedrich Nietzsche, Be~ond Good and Evil, trans. 
Marianne Cowan {Chicago: Henryegnery Company, l955), 
PP• 150ff. 
3A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (New York: 
Dover Publications, Inc., 1946), PP• 104ft. 
4R. M. Hare, The Langua~e of Morals (Oxford: 
The Clarendon Press, 1952), P• 6ff. 
5G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge: 
The University Press, 1956), pp. 104ft. 
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would be constructing then would be mine, not James's. 
In the second place, the task of saving utilitarianism 
from its attackers, especially such formidable thinkers 
as those represented above, would be a task befitting 
a whole thesis itself. In the third place, it is not 
necessary to defend James's principle of inclusiveness 
in order to understand it and the place it has in the 
re-construction of his ethical theory. 
c. Primacy of the Individual 
In the previous section, the principle of in-
clusiveness, in which the individual is seen as central, 
was examined. In the first section, James's version of 
indeterminism, by virtue of which the individual is 
free, was presented. In this section James's contention 
that the individual is the important unit for ethical 
theory will be examined. 
By 'individualism', James means that in a 
conflict between demands, resolution is to be sought 
which would bring satisfaction to the greatest number 
of individuals. In social affairs, the individual 
exists for and is essential to the society; whereas, 
the society is merely a convenience for the individuals. 
James's expressed purpose in adopting indeter-
minism is to avoid the necessity of valuing the world 
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as a unit. In a letter to Shadworth Hodgson, he says: 
The question of free will owes its entire being 
to a difficulty you disdain to notice, namely, that 
we cannot rejoice in such a whole, for it is not 
a palpable optimism, and yet, if it be predetermined, 
we must treat it as a whole. Indeterminism is the 
only way to break the world into good parts and 
into bai and to stand by the former as against the 
latter. 
James's individualism was thoroughly grounded 
in his pluralistic metaphysics and his radical empiri-
cism. This fact can be seen by the following quotation 
from The Will to Believe: 
This ~passage from B. P. Blood's The Flaw 
in Supremacy which denies any capacity for an all-
inclusive world view] is pluralism, somewhat 
rhapsodically expressed. He who takes his 
hypothesis the notion that it is the permanent 
form of the world is what I call a radical empiri-
cist. Fbr him the crudity of experience remains 
an eternal element thereof. There is no possible 
point of view from which the world ca~ appear an 
absolutely single fact. Real possibilitie~, real 
indeterminations, ••• , just as common sense con-
ceives these things, may remain in empiricism as 
conceptions which that philosophy gives up the 
attempt either to 'overcome' or to reinterpret 
in monistic form.2 
James wrote an essay entitled "On a Certain 
Blindness in Human Beings". It was an attempt to make 
his individualism more persuasive. He must have been 
somewhat disappointed at its reception because in incor-
1 Henry James, The Letters of lofilliam James, I, 
24_5,(italics his). 
2James, The Will to Believe, p. ix. 
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porating it into a book he wrote the £allowing pre£ace 
which makes plain his reliance upon pluralisrn £or his 
individualism: 
I wish I were able to make the second 
[essayJ , 'On a Certain Blindness in Human B~ings', 
more impressive. It is more than the mere p~ece 
of sentimentalism which it may seem to some readers. 
It connects itsel£ with a de£inite view o£ the 
world and o£ our moral relations to the same. Those 
who have done me the honor o£ reading my volume o£ 
philosophic essays will recognize that I mean the 
pluralistic or individualistic philosophy. Accor-
ding to that philosophy, the truth is too great for 
any one actual mind, even though that mind be 
dubbed •the Absolute', to know the whole of it. 
The £acts and worths of li£e need many cognizers 
to take them in. There is no point of view 
absolutely public and universal. • • • The prac-
tical consequence o£ such a philosophy is the 
well-known democratic respect for the sacredness 
o£ individuality.l 
In the essay itsel£, James condemns the blindness 
in some humans that makes for intolerance o£ all devia-
tions £rom the pattern imposed by society and social 
orders. These people are blind to the £eelings of those 
different from them, and their judgments concerning the 
signi£icance of the •non-con£ormists• are warped by in-
justice and stupidity. The genuine signi£icance of an 
individual's li£e lies in the particular £eelings, 
aspirations and strivings that make him unique. These 
idiosyncrasies are authentic for the individual, but 
lwilliam James, Talks to Teachers on Psychology: 
And to Students on Some of Life's Ideals (New York: 
Longmans, Green and Co., 1899), p. v. 
92 
their authenticity is known only to him. However, they 
are the basis for social evolution and if progress is 
to become real, they cannot be ignored, James made 
this last point in another essay entitled "The 
Importance of Individuals"! by saying that the area 
of individual differences and of social variations 
which are initiated by the idiosyncracies is the area 
of formative social processes, Thus, he says in con-
cluding "On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings", that 
we should cultivate an insight into individual differ-
ences and appreciate their value,2 
This was not a particularly new, nor unusual 
principle for James. In 1890 he made essentially the 
same claim: 
An unlearned carr,enter of my acquaintance once 
said in my hearing: 1There is very little differ-
lJames, The Will to Believe, pp. 255ft. 
2Julius Bixler feels that James's individualism 
may be an outgrowth of his life-long artistic interests: 
Perhaps it is James's early artistic training 
which makes its influence felt here, for just as 
the greatest art finds universal qualities in the 
individual, so James seems to discover values in 
the whole-hearted aspirations of the human indivi-
dual spirit, 
Julius s. Bixler, Reli~ion in the Philosopht of 
William James (Boston: Marsha 1 Jones Company, 192 ), 
PP· 1o7-toa. 
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ence between one man and another; but what little 
there is, is very important". This distinction 
seems to me to go to the root of the matter,l 
A doctrine of individualism does, of course, have 
its problems. If the individual is to be supreme, what 
of society? If we are to accept James's view, should 
social order and social coercion be given up completely? 
If the individual is to be the primary unit of society, 
won't social chaos be the result? The difficulty 
raised by these questions was faced by James and re-
solved, James was a teacher at Harvard and a very 
active citizen in that community and in the larger 
communities of his country and the world, He is able 
to justify his membership in a community whenever he 
feels that the community is the modus for the expression 
of the individual. In an essay on "The True Harvard", 
he stated that it was the duty of Harvard to make room 
for, and encourage the individuals who were the "out-
side men": 
They come from the remotist outskirts of our 
country, without introductions, without school 
affiliations; special students, scientific students, 
graduate students, poor students of the College, 
who make their living as they go. They seldom or 
never darken the doors of the Pudding or the 
Porcellian; they hover in the background on days 
when the crimson color is most in evidence, but 
1James, The Will to Believe, pp. 256-257 
(italics his). 
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they nevertheless are intoxicated and exultant 
with the nourishment they find here. • • • When 
they come to Harvard, it is not primarily because 
she is a club. It is because they have heard of 
her persistently atomistic constitution, of her 
tolerance of exceptionality and eccentricity, of 
her devotion to the principles of individual voca-
tion and choice •••• The university most worthy 
of rational admiration is that one in which your 
lonely thinker can feel himself least lonely, 
most positively furthered and most richly fed.l 
He repeats the same theme in another essay in the same 
book: 
Surely the individual, the person in the 
singular number, is the more fundamental phenomenon, 
and the social institution, of whatever grade, is 
but secondary and ministerial. Many as are the 
interests which social systems satisfy, always 
unsatisfied interests remain over, and among them 
are interests to which system, as such, does 
violence whenever it lays its hand upon us. The 
best commonwealth will always be the one that most 
cherishes the men who represent the residual 
interests, the one that leaves the largest scope 
to their peculiarities.2 
The institution, then, can only justify its 
existence if it allows for the fullest possible expression 
of the individual. The ethical inclusiveness implied 
by James's answer to the casuistic question is under-
standable only in light of his emphasis upon the impor-
tance of the individual. Inclusiveness and individual-
ism are not inconsistent as long as one is the master 
lwilliam James, Memo~ies and Studies (New York: 
Longmans, Green and Co., l9ll), pp. 356-354. 
2Ibid., pp. 102-103. 
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of the other, and for James the principle of inclu-
siveness was the servant. In a college composed solely 
of Mark Hopkins at one end of a log and a student at the 
other, the student's individualism would suffer for a 
lack of resources especially books. At cer·tain points, 
an institution, a cow~unity or a society is necessary. 
The principle to be observed, however, is that the social 
organisms should exist only to develop the individual. 
In order to develop a community, certain individual 
similarities must be present, however, the development 
of a community is meaningless apart from the individual 
and at least one of the similarities between the individ-
uals should be a respect for other individuals: 
The institutional life of men must necessarily 
be based on their likenesses, but its purpose is to 
make room for their differences. It is what slips 
through the meshes of classification and resists 
organization that justifies either classification 
or organization.l 
D. The Problem of Evil 
The phrase "problem of evil" rarely appears in 
James's writings, but the idea always seems to be 
hovering in the background of his thought. His solu• 
tion to the problem -- that evil is real -- is grounded 
lperry, The Thought and Character ••• , II, 
96 
in his metaphysics: 
Only one thing is certain, and that is the 
result of our criticism of the absolute: the only 
way to escape from the paradoxes and perplexities 
is that a consistently thought-out monistic 
universe suffers from a species of auto-intoxication 
-- the mystery of the 'fall' namely, of reaLity 
lapsing into appearance, truth into error, perfec-
tion into imperfection, of evil, in short: the 
mystery of universal determinism, of the block-
universe eternal and without a history, etc.; --
the only way of escape, I say, from all this is to 
be frankly pluralistic.l 
Early in his philosophic career (1870) James 
made the following entry into his diary and, thus, 
laid the foundation for his ensuing solution to the 
problem of evil and his metaphysics: 
Can one with full knowledge and sincerely 
ever bring one's self so to sympathize with the 
total process of the universe as heartily to 
assent to the evil which seems inherent in its 
detail? Is the mind so purely fluid and plastic? 
If so, optimism is possible. Are, on the other 
hand, the private interests and sympathies of 
the individual so essential to his existence that 
they can never be swallowed up in his feeling for 
the total process, -- and does he nevertheless 
imperiously crave a reconciliation or unity of 
some sort. Pessimism must be his portion. But 
if, as in Homer, a divided universe be a con-
ception possible for his intellect to rest in, 
and at the same time he have vigor of will enough 
to look universal death in the face without blink-
ing, he can lead the life of moralism.2 
James's polemic on the problem of evil is 
delivered, of course, against Bradley, but also, and 
lJames, Pluralistic Universe, p. 310. 
2Perry, The Thought and Character ••• , I, 322. 
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more important in both a personal and a philosophic 
manner; it is aimed at Royce. In 1885, Royce pub-
lished his book, The Religious Aspect of Philosophyt 
in which he had a section on "The Problem of Evil". 
In that section, he attempted to incorporate evil in the 
total structure of the Absolute. That section be-
came a stumbling block for James. James feels that 
on the face of it such an attempt necessarily commits 
Royce to the distrusted ublock universe", and worse, 
it commits Royce to view evil not as evil but as part 
of the Good, and, thus, not fight evil with the moral 
heroism James feels is necessary. The charge of "mis-
understanding" which James uses against most of his 
critics, can be turned against him at this point. 
Nothing could be more false than to view Royce's 
Absolute as a static, non-dynamic perfection. Indeed, 
in his Studies of Good and Evil, Royce even said that 
only a false idealism can regard evil as an illusion. 2 
Ultimately, for Royce, the unity of things as he 
experiences them is an emotional and moral unity. 
lJosiah Royce, The Reli~ous Aspect of Philosophy (New York: Harper & Brothers, blishers, 1958), cf. 
especially PP• 449-460. 
Josiah Royce, Studies of Good and Evil (New York: 
D. Appleton Company, 1898), p.17. 
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But it is a unity, none the less. Evil is there 
for Royce, bitter and painful; but it serves a purpose. 
Its purpose is to arouse in us resistance and even 
James's moral heroism. It was this element that dis-
turbed James. In fighting evil, he was ready to admit 
that the fight and the victory are good, but to say 
that the evil, too, is good is like saying that a sick-
ness is good because it gives the doctor an opportunity 
to resist it. 
Bixler quotes James as saying: 
The scale of evill defies all human toler-
ance, and transcendental idealism in Bradley or 
Royce carries us no further than the book of 
Job. • • • A God who can relish such super-
fluities of horror is no God for human beings to 
appeal to.2 
lin casting about for an examnle of the evil-
ness which he could not condone, James chose the 
following: 
Hardly any one can remain entirely optimistic 
after reading the confession of the murderer at 
Brockton the other day: how, to get rid of the 
wife whose continued existence bored him, he in-
veigled her into a desert spot, shot her four 
times, and then, as she lay on the ground and 
said to him, "You didn't do it on purpose, did 
you, dear?" replied "No, I didn't do it on pur-
pose11, as he raised a rock and smashed her skull. 
Such an occurrence, with the mild sentence and 
self-satisfaction of the prisoner, is a field for 
a crop of regrets. 
James, The Will to Believe, PP• 160-161. 
2 Bixler, pp. 36-37. 
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Thus, James felt that the call for moral 
heroism would only make sense if the reality of evil 
is recognized "straight off". Granted, there is an 
element of being elated in the victory, that element 
cannot be mistakenly made equivalent to the whole of 
goodness. That the allies defeated Hitler is good, un-
doubtedly; but, that Hitler ever gained power is evil. 
Perry makes this same point in defending James: 
Evil cannot be explained away. Its stark 
odiousness is not to be relieved by any specula-
tive sleight of hand. The conflict between good 
and evil is irreconcilable -- that is the undeni-
able and unpalatable fact; and philosophy is the 
brave and candid recognition of the fact. The 
recognition of this fact is morally exhilarating. 
But to conceive the exhilaration of the combat as 
the intrinsic good of which the enemy therefore 
is the necessary and desirable condition is ob-
fuscation and treason.l 
In sum, the individual is free and to be 
judged as an individual. He should vote for the greatest 
possible amount of good which will include a vote for 
maintaining as much room for individual expression as 
possible. This gives us a pluralistic, restless universe 
in which we must all summon our best efforts to defeat 
evil. There is, thus, a fighting spirit, a moral-
heroism throughout James's ethics. Perry says on this 
point: 
149. 
lPerry, Iri The Spirit of William James, pp. 148-
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The martial spirit was implied in James's 
moral dualism. Good is good and evil is evil, and 
it is the part of righteousness to love the one 
and to hate the other with equal whole-heartedness. 
To a "motor" hating can only mean attacking and 
destroying. This was James's attitude from youth: 
"To hate evil does not mean to indulge in a brood-
ing feeling against particular evils; that is, to 
be possessed by it. No, it is to avert the atten-
tion, till your chance comes, and then strike home".l 
The next chapter will show how James followed 
his own commands and rallied his martial spirit in 
attempting to defeat evil and further the good as he 
saw it. 
1Perry, The Thought and Character • •• , II, 
p. 271. 
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James's standard of international politics 
was an application of his individualism: tolerate 
differences, and enjoy them. To this he added 
the u!ual corollary, that intolerance is intoler-
able. 
D. Conclusion 
I have not attempted to defend James's critique 
of the social conditions of his time. I have merely 
attempted to demonstrate that James's ethical theory 
was not a detached-ivory-tower theory which failed to 
be put into application. James used his intellectual 
ability to decide what was right and then committed 
himself to that course which would bring about the 
greatest amount of good. He even pursued this policy 
when it meant doing things which were not enjoyable. 
He was faithful to his own doctrine of tolerance and 
distrustful of all attempts of a large, powerful group 
to dominate a smaller one. Once again, I think Perry 
can state the concluding case most clearly and put it 
in its proper perspective: 
The word "totalitarianism" seems expressly 
invented to single out what was most repugnant 
to James -- in metaphysics, as well as in morals 
and politics.2 
llli.£., P• 315. 
2Ralph Barton Perry 1 "If James Were Alive Today" 1 
In Commemoration of William James (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1942), PP• 75-76. 
CHAPTER V 
SOCIAL APPLICATION OF JAMES'S 
ETHICAL THEORY 
The purpose of this chapter is purely exposi-
tory in nature. The chapter intends to demonstrate, 
not only that James attempted to use his ethical theory 
for social criticism, but also how he accomplished 
the task. I have no intention of defending James's 
response to social problems. Any attempt to prove his 
criticism either adequate or correct would involve a 
great deal of historical background as to the political, 
economic and social situation in the United States 
around the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
I don't think that this thesis is the proper place for 
such an attempt. 
There is, of course, an ever-present difficulty 
in any attempt to prove the instantiation of a theory. 
The whole question of the relationship between theory 
and practice -- whether it is a one or two way process 
-- is raised when such an attempt is made. With 
James the attempt is doubly hard because while he was 
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a very active participant in the social climate of his 
day, his social criticism is confined entirely to letters 
and occasional references in other essays. The problem, 
then, is to determine some theoretical means by which 
one could justifiably say that a theory is put into 
practice. A mere description of the theory, the activ-
ity and demonstration of consistency, while a minimum 
requirement, would seem to be insufficient. Consis-
tency is, after all, only a negative criterion (lack of 
inconsistency) and it seems that something more is 
needed. 
The method used here will be to present some of 
the "causes" which James championed, and some of the occa-
sions on which he turned his attention to social criti• 
cism. In each instance, sufficient historical back-
ground will be given to show the principle of James's 
response. Finally, I shall present his reflections on 
his action along with his reasons for acting as he did• 
and I shall attempt to demonstrate how those reflections 
grew out of his "inclusive individualism". While this 
cannot be construed as conclusive proof that James put 
his theory into practice (indeed, even a! may not have 
been aware of the reason for his actions), it is at 
least an indication that he intended to do so. 
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The first section of this chapter will show 
that James became very involved in the social contro-
versies of his day. The second section will demonstrate 
his application of his insistence upon the primacy of 
the individual and its corollary -- tolerance. The 
third section will show how he actually obeyed his own 
call for "moral heroism" and for recognizing the neces-
sity of fighting evil with all one's ability and not 
subsuming it under the Absolute. The final section will 
attempt to draw a meaningful conclusion about James's 
social criticism and its relation to his metaphysics and 
ethics. 
A. Involvement 
James was keenly aware of the social respon-
sibilities of the intellectual class. In an address 
before the Graduate School at Harvard he said: 
So far, then, as the mission of the educated 
intellect in society is not to find or invent 
reasons for the demands of passion, it reduces it-
self to this small but incessant criticizing, or 
equalizing function. • • • The intellectual critic 
as such knows of so many interests, that to the 
ardent partisan he seems to have none -- to be a 
sort of bloodless Dore and mugwump. Those who 
anticipate the verdict of history, the abolitionists, 
les intellectuals, as the university professors 
were called who stood out for Dreyfus, the present 
anti-imperialists etc., excite an almost corporeal 
antipathy. • • • Often their only audience is 
104 
posterity. Their names are rirst honored when 
the breath has lert their bodies, and, like the 
holders of insurance policies, they must die to 
win their wager. • •• 1 
However, James was not an intellectual idealist 
who saw his most meaningful position in an ivory tower. 
After a meeting of the anti-imperialist league, James 
said: 
I came away saddened by the sight of what 
I knew already, that when you get a lot of pure 
idealists together they don't show up a.s strong 
HS an equal lot of practical men. In fact this 
crowd rather justified the "low grade" of t~ 
veneration with which the usual voter regards 
it.2 
Dickinson s. Miller once wrote of James: 
"Not detachment, but attachment, was his quality".3 
James was attached to his society and saw his position 
of attachment as that of a social critic always en-
couraging men to put their best efforts into their 
commitments. The comparison to Socrates as a gadfly 
is obvious and enlightening. Perry says that James's 
active support of "caases" reveals the nature of his 
practical idealism. For James the good is not only to 
lPerry, Thought and Character ••• , II, 299. 
2!£i£., P• 294 (italics his). 
3Quoted in ~·• P• 315. 
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" 
be contemplated, but also it is to be brought about.l 
In a letter to the Polish philosopher, w. Lutoslawski, 
James indicates his involvement in some causes: 
My name is already identified with so many 
unorthodox things, such as psychical research, anti-
imperialism, mind-cure medicine, etc,, that if 
I were now to begin to figure as a Polish patriot 
the only place left for me in public esteem here 
would be a lunatic asylum!2 
In another context, Perry describes James as 
a "mugwump, an anti-imperialist, a civil service re• 
former, a pacifist, a Dreyfusite, an internationalist 
and a liberar~3 Frequently, James accused those who 
were critical of him of being too abstract and of a 
failure to understand the concrete situation. 
In sum, James was an intellectual who felt 
that intellectuals have a social responsibility and 
still was an active participant in advocating causes, 
B. Importance of Individual and Tolerance 
James's individualism caused him to frequently 
rebel against and condemn attempts to subdue individual• 
ism under a larger order: 
1Ibid., p. 319. 
2JE.!.!!. 1 P• 216. 
3cf. especially ~·• p. 310 and 313. 
106 
I am so rebellious at all formal and prescrip-
tive methods -- a dry and bony individual, repelling 
fusion.l 
He felt the tremendous social pressure which 
would cause an individual to loose his identity. He 
projected that feeling and decided that all people 
hated forced socializing. A wonderful story is told 
about his reactions on this point. At one of the 
parties they frequently gave for students, Mrs. James 
found a bewildered student who had been accosted by 
James: 
r;:_ "I come in again", he fi;he studenj replied 
L!iO Jllirs. JameiJ , "to get my hat. I was trying 
to find my way to the dining-room when Mr. James 
swooped at me and said, 'Here, Smith, you want 
to get out of this Hell, don't you? I'll show 
you how. There!' A~efore I could answer, he'd 
popped me out throu~h the back-door. But, really, 
I do not want to go. "2 
James's distrust of forced socializing carried 
over to a general distrust of large organizations in 
which forced socializing is unavoidable: 
I am against bigness and greatness in all 
their forms, and with the invisible molecular moral 
forces that work from individual to individual •• 
• • The bigger the unit you deal with, the 
hollower, the more brutal, the more mendacious is 
the life displayed.3 
lHenry J&~es, The Letters of William James, 
II, 2,5.5. 
2Ibid., P• 9. 
3Ibid., P• 90. 
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James criticized his own university for tailing 
to recognize the importance of the individual in two 
articles:l 
I believe that in this case fJames is re-
ferring to Tom Davidson here, but the im~licit 
reference to c. s. Peirce is unavoidabl~, as 
in one or two others like it, which I might men-
tion, Harvard University lost a great opportun-
ity. Organization and method mean much, but 
contagious human characters mean more.2 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Surely the individual, the person in the 
singular number, is the more fundamental 
phenomenon, and the social institution, of what-
eve) grade, is but secondary and ministerial •• 
• • 
James's individualism led him to be a spokes-
man tor some rather odd causes. In 1894 and 1898 two 
bills were presented to the Massachusetts Legislature 
requiring the examination and licensing of all medical 
practitioners. The bills included clauses which attempted 
to abolish "faith-curers" by requiring them to become 
Doctors of Medicine. James was moved by his interest 
in mental therapy and his chronic distrust of larger 
organizations failing to understand the position of 
lcf. "Tom Davidson: A Knight-Errant of the 
Intellectual Life" and "The University and the Indivi-
dual". James, Memories and Studies. 
2~. P• 84. 
3~., PP• 102ft. 
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the individuals involved. He knew as well as the 
others that many of these faith healers were humbugs 
praying on superstition and ignorance, but he felt that 
mental therapy was a new area of inquiry and everyone's 
attempt should be given room. In appearing before the 
legislature he said: 
I assuredly hold no brief for any of these 
healers, and must confess that my intellect has 
been unable to assimilate their theories, so far 
as I have heard them given. But their facts are 
present and startling; and anything that inter-
feres with the multiplication of such facts, and 
with our freest opportunity of observing and 
studying them, will, I believe, be a public 
calamity.l 
This cause may serve, also, to demonstrate 
James's application of his moral heroism. In a letter 
to a friend, who was a professor in Harvard Medical 
School, James said: 
If you think I ~ that sort of thing you 
are mistaken. I never-did anything that required 
as much moral effort in my life. • • • Legisla-
tive license is sheer humbug -- mere abstract 
paper thunder under which every ignorance and 
abuse can still go on. Why this mania for more 
laws? Why seek to stop the really extremely 
important experiences which these peculiar 
creatures are rolling up?2 
The anti-license cause should also indicate 
a corollary of James's social theory-- tolerance. 
lHenry James, The Letters of William James, 
II, 69 (italics his). 
2Ibid., p. 66 (italics his). 
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However, it was on the issue of temperance that he 
showed his real tolerance, In an age when tempers 
flared frequently over the issue and when people 
sought refuge in the extremes of committees and 
leagues, James's voice was raised on the side of 
tolerance. James, himse~f had a fundamental dislike 
of the use of alcohol, but, as Perry says, "there was 
at the same time a counter~attraction: he found 
abstinence more intoxicating than indulgence", 1 
He refused a request of F. G. Peabody to join the 
Total Abstinence League because he felt that the 
membership had an intolerant attitude toward the non~ 
members, 
C, The Militant Liberal2 
James's distrust of large forces working 
against smaller ones, his dislike of intolerance and 
his militant desire to undo evil wherever it became 
apparent, all combined in making him a staunch anti-
imperialist, 
lPerry, The Thought and Character , •• , II, 
300. 
~his heading is taken from the title of 
Chapter IV of Perry, In the Spirit of William James, 
PP• 124-169, 
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In February, 1898, the battleship Maine was 
destroyed in Havana by an "unknown" source. On April 
19 1 1898, Congress passed the famous "Teller" resolu• 
tion recognizing the independence of Cuba and in 
effect declaring war on Spain. The Spanish-American 
War lasted just 115 days during which time, Commodore 
George Dewey took the Philippines from Spain, General 
w. R. Shafter took Cuba and General Miles took Puerto 
Rico. Spain acknowledged defeat and the United States 
signed a treaty by which she took control of all the 
territory. During the early stages of diplomatic 
talk, before war was in sight, James was in favor of 
our attempt to free the Cuban people. However, as 
soon as the war fever was aroused, James distrusted 
the whole affair because he saw that the monied and 
warring interests would settle for nothing short of 
annexation.l He realized that this was a cause which 
must be opposed militantly: 
Let us be for or against; and if against, 
then against by every means in our power, when 
a policy is taking shape that is bound to alter 
all the national ideals that we have cult1vat.ed 
hitherto. • • • Let us consult our reason as to 
~his sentiment is well expressed in a letter 
to Fran9ois Pillon in: Henry James, The Letters of 
William James, II, 73-74. 
lll 
what is best, and then exert ourselves as citi-
zens with all our might.l 
While James felt that these territories should 
be free of Spanish oppression, he saw no real benefit 
to them of being under the oppression of the United 
States. In either instance the individuality of the 
people was lost in the larger possessor. In a letter 
to the Boston Evening Transcript, James said: 
It is obvious that for our rulers at 
Washington the Filipinos have not existed as 
psychological quantities at all. • • • We 
have treated them as if they were a painted 
picture, an amount of mere matter in our way. 
They are too remote from us ever to be realized 
as they exist in their inwardness. • • • They 
&he ruler~ mouth formulas such as "unfit to 
govern themselve~, without seeing the population 
of the Philippines face to face as a concrete 
reality.2 
James's anti-imperialistic sentiments were 
aroused, on another occasion, by President Cleveland's 
decision that the United States had the right to 
settle a boundary dispute between Venezula and British 
Guiana. There were many angry diplomatic messages 
sent between Great Britain and the United States, 
and James revealed both his bitterness and his appraisal 
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lperry, The Thought and Character • • •• II, 
2Ibid., P• 311. 
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in a letter to an English friend -- F. w. H. Meyers: 
Well, our countries will soon be soaked in 
each other's gore. You will be disemboweling 
me, and Hodgson cleaving Lodge's skull. • • • I 
hate to think of Hembruing" my hand in (or with?) 
your blood.l 
James distrusted imperialism, not only in his 
own country, but also in others. The next quotation 
shows his dislike of imperialism and his immense 
perceptivity linked with his idea that the intellec-
tual must die to win his wager: 
The Boers of course must be licked, but also 
England ought to get out of South Africa, and 
leave the Africans to settle their own affairs. 
She won't; and there'll be endless trouble.2 
James saw the imperialistic spirit in the 
United States as a step-backward in the long journey 
toward a government which would be able to recog-
nize differences in individuals and tolerate them. 
He had a profound respect for the democratic govern• 
ment and the general Hplasticity" of the American 
people. Imperializing brought out the worst in the 
people and was the antithesis of James's ethical 
theory. Perry has remarked quite correctly: 
lHenry James, The Letters of William James, 
II, 31-32. 
253. 
2Perry, The Thought and Character • • ., II, 
This was written in 1900. 
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CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, it is obvious that an ethical 
theory can be constructed on the basls of James's writ-
ings. We have seen the development of the basic princi-
ples of his ethical theory and their application to 
social criticism. I shall now present a summary of the 
results of my research. 
Chapter II dealt with the problem of the place 
of reason in James's ethical theory. It was essential 
to deal with this problem before presenting the basic 
principles of his ethical theory because the solution 
of it makes the argument for the basic principles mean-
ingful. In this chapter, we saw James arrive at the 
conclusion that reason is limited, The contrary posi-
tion which maintains that reason is sufficient for mak-
ing moral decisions was examined. In criticizing that 
position, which is called intellectualism, James says 
that there are two epistemological maxims: know truth 
and avoid error. The latter, if strictly obeyed, might 
tend to turn one away from truth needlessly, when it is 
within his grasp. James's final criticism of intellec-
tualism is that it relies for its own foundation upon 
11$ 
something more than reason. Intellectualism can only 
be asserted on the grounds of faith or volitional nature. 
Scepticism was criticized in the same manner by James. 
Scepticism is merely one act of the volitional nature 
laying down the law over all other acts of the volitional 
nature and saying that they are improper. Finally, 
we saw that James exercised his own volitional nature 
in going beyond reason. 
In Chapter III, the limitations on the use of 
the volitional nature and some criticisms of James's 
position were presented. The first limitation on the 
use of the volitional nature is that the evidence in 
the problem in question should be either non-existent 
or non-conclusive. The second limitation on the use 
of the volitional nature is that the option presented 
should be a genuine option. For James, a genuine option 
is one that simultaneously meets the conditions of 
being live, forced and momentous. While the intent of 
presenting the criticisms of James's position was to 
make his position more clear through the medium of 
polemic, it was seen that at least the critics we con-
sidered rather than damaging James's position merely 
failed to understand him. We did see, however, that 
there were some problem areas for an adequate defense 
of James. In the first place, his definition of terms 
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is more metaphorical than precise. This was especially 
apparent and troublesome in considering the live option. 
James did try to exemplify what he meant by a live op-
tion, but unless it is treated as a psychological cate-
gory rather than a philosophic restriction, even the 
example he uses can be open to serious question. In 
the second place, while James's argument, that reason 
is limited and that we are justified in going beyond 
reason, is very persuasive, it would seem to be weak 
unless he can give a criterion for determining when 
evidence is sufficient and when it is not sufficient. 
I suggested that his doctrine of pragmatism may be of 
some help to him here, but that in so far as it is only 
a definition of truth, he needs more, he needs a cri-
terion of adequate evidence. I concluded that before 
any philosophy of religion based upon James could be 
considered adequate, some account must be given for 
a criterion of the sufficiency of reason whether it be 
pragmatic or not. Fortunately, James did give an 
answer as to the grounds on which he felt that reason 
is insufficient in making moral decisions. Since rea-
son can only tell us about what is and not what should 
be, it is insufficient to establish the basic princi-
ples of an ethical theory. Given a goal, reason may 
be able to tell us how to get to the goal. However, 
llq 
the problem for an ethical theory is to establish the 
goal and reason is insufficient at that point. 
The basic principles of James's ethical 
theory were discussed in Chapter IV. The first topic 
discussed dealt with James's brand of indeterminism. 
James says that in order to decide between determinism 
and indeterminism the volitional nature is properly 
operative. However, an immediate problem can be raised 
to the effect that by saying that the volitional nature 
is properly operative, the whole case has already been 
biased in favor of indeterminism. The only way out of 
this circularity is by an appeal to his pluralistic 
metaphysics. With the presentation of the place of 
reason, the place of the volitional nature and indeter-
minism, the foundation had been laid upon which James's 
casuistry could be presented. Fbr James, the satisfac-
tion of demand is good, but all demands cannot be 
satisfied since some demands are inconsistent or con-
tradictory. Thus, the casuistic principle for James 
is to satisfy as many demands as possible. This princi-
ple leads James to establish the fundamental primacy 
of the individual. The last basic principle of James's 
ethical theory which was established is the reality of 
evil. James's inclusive individualism combined with 
his assertion of the reality of evil leads him to call 
118 
for moral heroism. 
Chapter V is an attempt to demonstrate that 
James's ethical theory was not a "closet" solution to 
ethical problems. James was very active as a social 
critic. In supporting the cause of the "faith-curers", 
we saw James exercising his respect for the individual 
even at the expense of his own enjoyment. In the case 
of James's own temperant nature, and his refusal to 
join anti-temperance leagues, we saw a demonstration 
of the tolerance which is a corollary of his inclusive 
individualism. James's anti-imperialist feelings and 
activities were an excellent example of his militancy 
and moral heroism in the face of what he thought was 
evil, a violation of all his ethical principles 
inclusiveness, individualism and tolerance. 
In sum, an ethical theory can be constructed 
for James which accounts for the place of reason, the 
place of volitional nature, which has basic princi-
ples and which can be applied to social criticism. 
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ABSTRACT 
The problem for this thesis is primarily to 
determine if an ethical theory can be constructed for 
William James and, incidentally, to determine what 
relationship it bears to the rest of his philosophy. 
If the ethical theory is to be constructed, it must 
give some account for the place of reason in ethical 
decisions as well as some account of basic ethical 
principles. 
It is essential to deal with the problem of 
the place of reason in James's ethical theory before 
presenting the basic principles of his ethical theory 
because the solution of it makes the argument for the 
basic principles meaningful. James arrives at the 
conclusion that reason is limited. In criticizing the 
contrary position, which he calls intellectualism, James 
says that there are two epistemological maxims: know 
truth and avoid error. The latter, if strictly obeyed, 
might tend to turn one away from truth needlessly, when 
it is within his grasp. James's final criticism of 
intellectualism is that it relies for its own foundation 
upon something more than reason. Intellectualism can 
only be asserted on the grounds of faith or volitional 
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nature. Scepticism is criticized in the same manner by 
James. Scepticism is merely one act of the volitional 
nature laying down the law over all other acts of the 
volitional nature and saying that they are improper. 
Finally, James must exercise his own volitional nature 
in going beyond reason. 
James feels that there are limitations which 
should be put on the use of the volitional nature. 
First, in order to use the volitional nature, James 
says that the evidence for making a decision in the 
problem in question should be either non-existent 
or non-conclusive. The second limitation on the use 
of the volitional nature is that the option presented 
should be a genuine option. For James, a genuine option 
is one that simultaneously meets the conditions of 
being live, forced and momentous. In considering James's 
critics, it may be said that rather than damaging his 
position they merely fail to understand him. However, 
there are some problem areas for an adequate defense of 
James. In the first place, his definition of terms is 
more metaphorical than precise. This is especially 
apparent and troublesome in considering the live option. 
James does try to exemplify what he means by a live 
option, but unless it is treated as a psychological 
category rather than a philosophic restriction, even 
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the example he uses can be open to serious question. 
In the second place, while James's argument that reason 
is limited and that we are justified in going beyond 
reason, is very persuasive, it would seem to be weak 
unless he can give a criterion for determining when 
evidence is sufficient and when it is not sufficient. 
His doctrine or pragmatism may be of some help to him 
here, but in so far as it is only a definition of truth, 
he needs more, he needs a criterion of adequate evidence. 
Before any philosophy of religion based upon James can 
be considered adequate, some account must be given for 
a criterion of the sufficiency of reason whether it be 
pragmatic or not. Fortunately, James did give an 
answer as to the grounds on which he felt that reason 
is insufficient in making moral decisions. Since rea-
son can only tell us about what is and not what should 
be, it is insufficient to establish the basic princi-
ples of an ethical theory. Given a goal, reason may 
be able to tell us how to get to the goal. However, 
the problem for an ethical theory is to establish the 
goal, and reason is insufficient at that point. 
The basic principles of James's ethical 
theory are discussed next. The first topic discussed 
deals with James's brand of indeterminism. James says 
that in order to decide between determinism and indeter-
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minism the volitional nature is properly operative. 
However, an immediate problem can be raised to the 
ef'fect that by saying that the volitional nature is 
properly operative, the whole case has already been 
biased in favor of indeterminism. The only way out of 
this circularity is by an appeal to his pluralistic 
metaphysics. With the presentation of the place of 
reason, the place of the volitional nature and indeter-
minism, the foundation has been laid upon which James's 
casuistry can be presented. For James, the satisfac-
tion of demand is good, but all demands cannot be 
satisf'ied since some demands are inconsistent or con-
tradictory. Thus, the casuistic principle for James 
is to satisfy as many demands as possible. This princi-
ple leads James to establish the fundamental primacy 
of the individual. The last basic principle of James's 
ethical theory which is established has to do with the 
reality of evil. James's inclusive individualism com-
bined with his assertion of the reality of evil leads 
him to a call for moral heroism. 
It is interesting to note that James's ethical 
theory was not a "closet" solution to ethical problems. 
James was very active as a social critic. In supporting 
the cause of the "faith-curers", James demonstrated 
his respect for the individual even at the expense of 
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his own enjoyment. In the case or James's own temper-
ant nature, and his refUsal to join anti-temperance 
leagues, he demonstrated the tolerance which is a 
corollary of his inclusive individualism. James's 
anti-imperialist feelings and activities were an 
excellent example of his militancy and moral heroism 
in the face of what he thought was evil, a violation 
of all his ethical principles -- inclusiveness, individ-
ualism and tolerance. 
In sum, an ethical theory can be constructed 
for James which accounts for the place of reason, the 
place of volitional nature, which has basic princi-
ples and which can be applied to social criticism. 
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